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INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises out of an interpleader action filed by Provident Life and
Ci@

Accident Insurance Company ("Provident") in connection with a claim for $75,000
in life insurance proceeds. The insured, Keith T. Wirtz died on January 3, 2015.
Provident's records showed that the Keith was both the owner of the policy and the
insured, and that the policy had been purchased years ago, when he was still married
to Dawneen Wirtz. Dawneen and Keith had since divorced, and Keith had remarried,
but the beneficiary designation remained unchanged. Following Keith's death,
Dawneen, the ex-spouse, made a claim as beneficiary of the policy.
Provident investigated the claim and found that Utah, like many states, has in
its Probate Code an "automatic revocation" statute, Utah Code§ 75-2-804(2) which
automatically revokes a divorced spouse as beneficiary of any revocable disposition
or appointment of property, unless otherwise provided in the terms of a governing
instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to division of the marital estate.
Section 75-2-804(7)(b) expressly authorizes an insurer who receives notice of a
divorce and a possible statutory revocation to interplead the funds into court and
further states that such a payment discharges the insurer from all claims for the
amounts so paid.
Relying on this Utah statute, Provident determined that Dawneen' s
designation as a beneficiary of the policy may have been revoked by statute and that
I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Keith's surviving spouse or his estate may have a claim to the policy proceeds.
Provident wrote to Dawneen, explained its concern regarding the effect of the
automatic revocation statute, and asked her to provide copies of the paperwork
related to her divorce from Keith, a copy of any property settlement, and any other
information that would support her claim to the proceeds. Dawneen provided copies
of the Decree of Divorce and an Order on Petition to Modify and Judgment, but
neither document mentioned life insurance in any way. Dawneen produced no
governing instrument, court order, or contract that appeared to modify the effect of
the revocation statute. Based on its investigation, Provident initially denied
Dawneen' s claim. But after further communication with Dawneen and her counsel,
Provident elected to interplead the funds, as expressly authorized by the statute and
based on its reasonable belief that it could be exposed to liability from Keith's
surviving spouse or from his estate if it paid the policy proceeds to Dawneen.
Provident named as defendants to the action: Dawneen (the ex-spouse), Margene
Wirtz (the surviving spouse), and Keith's estate, and asked the Court to require those
defendants to litigate amongst themselves as to who is the rightful beneficiary of the
policy proceeds.
Dawneen disagrees with Provident' s interpretation of the automatic
revocation statute. She asserts that despite what was written in Provident' s records,

2
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GiJ

she was always the owner of the policy and that therefore the automatic revocation
statute does not apply. She alleged several coW1terclaims against Provident,
predicated on her allegation that Provident acted negligently and/or in bad faith when
it initially denied her claim and then filed this interpleader action.
Provident contends that the factual dispute raised by Dawneen regarding the
ownership of the policy and the legal dispute regarding the application of the
revocation statute merely illustrate why Provident's decision to interplead funds was
proper. Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the filing of an
interpleader action when a person "is or may be exposed to double or multiple
liability." (emphasis added). And Utah Code§ 75-2-804(7)(b) expressly invites an
insurer to file an interpleader action when faced with a possible application of the
revocation statute. Dawneen would have the Court penalize Provident for refusing
to play judge and jury on factual and legal questions that could have exposed it to
risk from multiple parties; but the law places no such burden on Provident. Rather,
it permits a neutral person in Provident's position to deposit the funds and allow the
various claimants to litigate such disputes amongst themselves.
The Trial Court agreed with Provident and held, on summary judgment, that
the matter was properly interpleaded and that Dawneen's counterclaims failed as a

3
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matter of law. Then, applying§ 75-2-804(7), the Court discharged Provident from
liability with respect to the policy proceeds.
On appeal, Dawneen raises two contentions, only one of which is properly
before the Court. First, she argues that Utah Code § 31A-22-413 should have
governed Provident's actions rather than Utah Code§ 75-2-804, and that "Provident
committed bad faith as a matter of law by disregarding" § 3 lA-22-413. But this
argument was not preserved at the Trial Court and fails in any event. Second, she
argues that the Trial Court erred in concluding that Provident properly interpleaded
the funds and in granting a discharge to Provident because there was no reasonable
basis for Provident to conclude that§ 75-2-804(2) may apply when Dawneen was
the "owner" of the Policy. This argument, while properly preserved, fails for a
number of reasons, but most importantly because all of the records indicated that
Keith was the owner of the Policy, thus giving Provident a reasonable basis to
conclude that the revocation statute may apply and that it may be exposed to double
or multiple liability if it paid the proceeds to Dawneen.
The Trial Court's decision on summary judgment should be upheld as
"correct."

4
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
As Framed by Appellee: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment and
discharge to Provident, where Utah Code§ 3 lA-22-413 establishes that Utah Code
§ 75-2-804(2) does not revoke an ex-spouse's beneficiary designation under a life
insurance policy, and where § 75-2-804(2), by its plain terms, does not apply to
benefits that an ex-spouse appoints to herself?
The_ Proper Statement As Framed by Appellant:
1. Did the Trial Court err in concluding, on summary judgment, that Provident
had properly interpleaded the claim under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 22,
Utah Code § 75-2-804(2), and Utah Code § 75-2-804(7)(b) based on a
reasonable belief that it was or could be exposed to double or multiple liability
with respect to the Policy proceeds under Utah Code § 75-2-804(2)?

2. Did the Trial Court err in granting summary judgment for Provident on each
of the counterclaims raised against it and discharging Provident of liability
with respect to the deposited funds pursuant to Utah Code § 75-2-804(7)(b )?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews a "grant of summary judgment for correctness." Dillon v.

Southern Management Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14,121,326 P.3d 656.

5
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ISSUE NOT PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT
The issue, as presented in Appellant's Brief and quoted above, was not
preserved in the Trial Court. Utah Code § 31A-22-413 and appellant's arguments
related thereto were never properly before the Trial Court, having never been raised
during the summary judgment briefing or the motion for reconsideration. The only
time § 31 A-22-413 was raised was in the context of a post-summary judgment
dispute over the payment of Provident's attorneys' fees, when Dawneen improperly
attempted to re-argue the merits of the summary judgment motion. R. 708-709 (only
place in the record that such arguments were made). Those arguments, being misplaced and never properly presented during any of the summary judgment briefing
or argument, should not be considered on appeal. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,359
(Utah App. 1993) ("As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue ...
raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the
case involves exceptional circumstances.") (citations omitted). The Appellate
Court's review should be limited to Dawneen's arguments under § 75-2-804.

6
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On or about January 23, 2015, Provident received a life insurance claim form
submitted by Dawneen Wirtz ("Dawneen"), who claimed to be the beneficiary of
life insurance policy number U9001795 (the "Policy"), insuring the life of Keith T.
Wirtz ("Keith"). R. 300-301. In connection with her claim, Dawneen submitted a
death certificate showing that Keith had died on January 3, 2015. R. 298. On the
claim form, Dawneen identified herself as the "ex wife" of the deceased. R. 300.
Provident promptly investigated the claim, including by writing to Dawneen
Wirtz on February 3, 2015 (and multiple times thereafter), to ask for more
information relevant to her claim. Because Utah has an automatic revocation statute,
Utah Code § 75-2-804, which may revoke a former spouse as a beneficiary of a life
insurance policy, Provident's February 3, 2015 letter informed Dawneen that her
rights as beneficiary may be affected by her divorce from Keith and requested that
she "provide a copy of the divorce decree and property settlement or other proof that
you are entitled to the proceeds of this policy." R. 316. Dawneen failed to respond
to the February 3, 2015 letter and Provident sent three more letters asking for the
same information. R. 317-319. Dawneen eventually responded and sent Provident a
copy of a Decree of Divorce dated August 28, 1990 (R. 321-322) and an October 17,
1994 Order on Petition to Modify and Judgment (R. 324-329). Neither the Decree
7
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of Divorce nor the Order on Petition to Modify and Judgment made any mention of
life insurance or of the Policy. See id; see also, R. 525 (Order Granting Interpleader
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, For Discharge, and for Attorney Fees and
Costs (hereafter "SJ Order")) at if 11. On April 16, 2015, Provident sent another
letter to Dawneen requesting additional information it needed in order to continue
its review. Specifically, Provident requested a copy of "the Property Settlement
Agreement that provides proof that you are entitled to the proceeds of this policy."
R. 525 at iJ 4; R. 335 (copy of April 16, 2015 letter). Dawneen called Provident on
April 22, 2015 and stated "that she does not have a Property Settlement Agreement
as she and Keith split up everything amicably." R. 359at115 (Declaration ofDenise
Ratliff); R. 337 (Provident's record of phone call).
Provident also learned that after his divorce from Dawneen, Keith had remarried, marrying Margene Taylor Wirtz in 1990. R. 523 at

if 4; see also R. 298

(death certificate identifying spouse as "Margene Taylor"). Margene and Keith
remained married until Keith's passing in 2015. R. 523 at 1 4; R. 92 at

if 15

(Amended Answer of Margene Wirtz).
Provident also investigated its own internal files and records relating to this
Policy, all of which showed that Keith was the "owner" of the Policy. R. 274, 276278, 358 at if 7,458, and 525 at if 14. The insurance Certificate states "Owner shall

8
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be the Insured under this Certificate unless changed at a later time." R. 282. The
Provident Group Policy likewise states, "Owner shall be the Insured under the
Certificate unless changed at a later time." R. 288. Keith was clearly identified as
the Insured on the Policy application (R. 270) and Dawneen admits that she never
submitted any change of ownership. R. 400 at 1 10, R. 431 at ,I 11 (Declaration of
Dawneen G. Wirtz ("At no time during the life of the insurance policy, did I Wirtz
ever request or submit any change of ownership or beneficiary of the policy.") To
the contrary, Provident' s records showed that Dawneen had called Provident in 2013
to inquire as to the Policy owner and was informed that the owner was Keith. R. 454.
She was advised that the ownership could be changed, if she and Keith chose to do
so. R. 456. But, she never submitted any change of ownership. R. 431 at 1 11.
Based on its investigation, Provident initially denied Dawneen' s claim. It sent
a letter to Dawneen on July 23, 2015, in which it stated, in relevant part:
Unfortunately, it appears that your designation as beneficiary of this
policy has been revoked by statute. Under the Utah Probate Code, the
designation of a spouse as beneficiary of a life insurance policy is
revoked upon divorce of the spouses.
Should you wish to provide any additional information that may
support your entitlement, please provide this to us within 20 days from
the date of this letter.
The Company's decision is based on the information in our file ... If
you have additional information that you believe may affect our
decision, please forward it to us for review. If additional information is
9
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provided, we expressly reserve our rights to continue the review of the
claim ....
R. 349, R. 525 at 115.
Following that initial denial, Dawneen retained counsel and challenged
Provident' s decision. On August 10, 2015, counsel for Dawneen sent a letter to
Provident, which states in relevant part:
I note that you have not provided a citation of section or subsection of
the Utah Probate Code in support of your assertion. My initial review
demonstrates that there is no basis to deny Mrs. Wirtz [Dawneen] the
benefits of the contract she has with your company, a contract for which
she alone paid premiums for 27 years. Please set forth, promptly, the
complete basis of your assertion that Mrs. Wirtz's beneficiary
designation is revoked.

R. 351, R. 526, 116.
On September 8, 2015, Provident sent a letter to counsel for Dawneen, which
states in relevant part:
In your recent correspondence, you requested the specific statute on
which our denial was based. We based this information on Utah Probate
Code statute 75-2-804. The Company's decision is based on the
information in our file ... If you have additional information that you
believe may affect our decision, please forward it to us for review ...

R. 353, R. 526, 117.
No further documentation was provided by Dawneen or her counsel. R. 3 61
at

1 20

(Declaration of Denise Ratliff). Nevertheless, after corresponding with

Dawneen's counsel, Provident determined that rather than deny Dawneen's claim
10
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for the death benefit, it would accept liability to pay the death benefit and would
interplead the money into court for the various potential claimants to litigate among
~

themselves. R. 362 at 121. Provident filed a Complaint in Interpleader on January
5, 2015. R. 1-5. In its Complaint, Provident admitted liability for payment of the
Policy proceeds and asked the Court to determine the proper beneficiary. Id
Provident named Dawneen (Keith's ex-spouse) and Margene Wirtz (Keith's
surviving spouse) as Defendants. R. 1-5. The Complaint was later amended to also
add Keith's estate as an additional defendant. R. 180-184.
Dawneen counterclaimed against Provident for: breach of contract, breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and
punitive damages. R. 226-235 (Answer to Amended Complaint in Interpleader,
Counterclaim, and Cross-Claim of Dawneen G. Wirtz).
Provident filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, for Discharge, and for
Attorneys' Fees. R. 248-365. After full briefing and oral argument, the motion was
granted by the Trial Court on December 19, 2016. Judge Laura Scott issued a
detailed Order Granting Interpleader Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, For
Discharge and For Attorney Fees and Costs. R. 522-529. Judge Scott stated that the
only issue before her was ''whether Provident properly interpleaded the $75,000

11
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proceeds from the life insurance policy and whether Dawneen's counterclaims
against Provident should be dismissed." Judge Scott found that under Rule 22 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Provident properly filed this interpleader action and interpleaded the
proceeds because it reasonably believed that it may be exposed to
double or multiple liability.
Although Dawneen alleges that it is clear under Utah Code § 7 5-2804(2) and the life insurance application that she is the owner of the
policy and therefore the only one entitled to the proceeds, the Court
does not find that such a conclusion was clear based on the information
that was available to Provident at the time it issued its denial.
Based on its review of the documentation provided by Dawneen,
Provident reasonably believed that it may be subject to double or
multiple liability because the beneficiary designation may have been
automatically revoked pursuant to Utah Code§ 75-2-804(2).
Because its filing of this interpleader action was permissible, Provident
is entitled to be discharged from this case as a matter of law.
R. 527 at ,r,r 4-6.
The Trial Court went on to address Dawneen' s counterclaims, concluding that
each "is predicated on Dawneen's allegation that Provident acted negligently and/or
in bad faith when it initially denied her claim and then filed this interpleader action,
thereby creating a dispute with Margene and the Estate ... " R. 527 at ,r 9. And unlike
the Lee v. West Coast case cited by Dawneen, 688 F.3d 1004 (9 th Cir. 2012), in which
the insurance company had negligently failed to have the proper owner sign the
~

12
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change of beneficiary form, "Dawneen does not allege any similar negligent conduct
by Provident.'' R. 528 at ,r 10. "Rather, Dawneen simply disagrees with Provident's
interpretation of Utah Code§ 75-2-804(2) ... and Provident's decision to interplead
the proceeds ... " R. 528 at ,r 11. The Trial Court further noted that "once Provident
decided to file an interpleader action, it was required to notify all parties with a
potential interest in the proceeds, including Margene and the Estate." R. 528 at ,r 12.
Thus, the Trial Court concluded:
In the absence of specific facts that would support an inference that
Provident's initial denial of her claim or its decision to file this
interpleader action was made in bad faith, Dawneen's counterclaims
fail as a matter of law. Indeed, if the Court determines that the statute
[Utah Code § 75-2-804(2)] applies, Provident cannot be liable for
following it and denying her claim. If the Court determines that the
statute does not apply, then the proceeds will be paid to Dawneen.
R. 528 at ,r 13.
The Trial Court dismissed all of Dawneen' s counterclaims with
prejudice, awarded Provident its reasonable fees and costs related to the filing
of the action, dismissed Provident from the case, and discharged Provident
from liability for the interpleaded funds. R. 529.

PROCEDURAL IDSTORY
After entry of summary judgment, Dawneen filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Reversal of Prior Order, and For Summary Judgment and
13
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Attorney's Fees and Costs. R. 531-535. This motion was denied by the Trial Court,
with a detailed ruling dated July 5, 2017. R. 575-578 (Ruling and Order on
Counterclaim Dawneen Wirtz's Motion for Reconsideration and Reversal of Prior
Order, and for Summary Judgment and Attorneys' Fees and Costs).
Thereafter, Dawneen sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the

~

summary judgment decision (R. 580-581), but her petition was denied (R. 590).
Dawneen subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment to establish her
entitlement to the Policy proceeds as against the other Defendants. R. 603-606.
While that motion was pending, the Defendants reached an agreement and entered
into a stipulation, pursuant to which the funds on deposit with the Court were ordered

~

released to Dawneen. R. 680-681.
Provident, having been discharged from the case, was unaware of the
Defendants' negotiations or of their stipulation for a final order for disbursement of
funds to Dawneen until the stipulated motion was filed and promptly signed by the
Trial Court. Provident had not yet received payment of its fees, so it objected to the
stipulation and final order of disbursement, asking that its fees first be paid from the
deposited funds before the remainder was distributed to Dawneen. See R. 684(Objection to Order for Disbursement of Interpleaded Funds and Dismissal of the
Case with Prejudice & Motion for Reconsideration). In responding to Provident's

14
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~

objection, Dawneen attempted to re-argue the merits of Provident's summary
judgment motion and raised for the first time her current arguments under Utah Code

§ 31A-22-413. R. 708-709. Dawneen filed her appeal to this Court on March 21,
2018. R. 752-753. The Trial Court did not rule on the dispute over Provident's fees
until April 5, 2018. R.774-781.

15
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point 1: Provident properly interpleaded the claim. Utah Code § 75-2-804(2) creates
a rebuttable presumption that a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy is
revoked upon divorce. Because Dawneen and Keith divorced, and Dawneen failed
to come forward with any documents or evidence to rebut the presumption,
Provident had a good faith basis to believe that the designation of Dawneen as
beneficiary of the Policy may have been revoked and that Provident may be exposed
to double or multiple liability if it paid the proceeds to Dawneen. In that context,
both Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code§ 75-2-804(7)(b)
permit Provident to interplead the policy proceeds. Dawneen's current dispute
regarding ownership of the policy does not negate the reasonableness of Provident's
decision to inteiplead the funds as her dispute was never raised during the claim
administration process and it was contrary to Provident's records, which all showed
Keith as the Policy owner.
Point 2: Dawneen failed to raise or preserve at the Trial Court level her argument
that Provident breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by "disregarding"
Utah Code§ 31A-22-413 which exempts life insurance policies from the automatic
revocation statute. Even if that argument had been considered by the Trial Court, it
is meritless and directly contradicted by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4.
16
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€6)

Point 3: Having properly interpleaded the funds in accordance with the statutory
invitation found in Utah Code § 75-2-804(7)(b), Provident was entitled to
interpleader protections under Rule 22, which includes protection from
counterclaims grounded upon its adherence to such statutorily authorized
procedures. Provident's decision to interplead the funds cannot support any of
Dawneen's causes of action.

17
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ARGUMENT

I.

Provident Properly Interpleaded the Claim.

a. Provident had a good faith basis to believe that Utah Code§ 75-2804(2) could aJ2Ply.

~

Provident chose to interplead the Policy proceeds based on its concerns
regarding the potential effect of Utah Code§ 75-2-804(2) on Dawneen's claim. As
recently explained by the Utah Supreme Court, section 75-2-804(2) "creates a
rebuttable presumption that a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy-a
governing instrument-is revoked upon divorce." Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4, 1
8. The presumption "can be rebutted by express terms in the life insurance policy; a
~

court order, including a decree of divorce; or a "contract relating to the division of
the marital estate made between the divorced individuals." Id
With her claim, Dawneen had identified herself as the "ex-spouse" of the
decedent. Under Hertzske, Provident was correct to assume that the revocation
statute applied and that the designation ofDawneen as beneficiary of the Policy was
revoked upon her divorce from Keith.
Consistent with the statute, Provident asked Dawneen if she had any court
order, decree of divorce, or property settlement that would rebut the presumption
that her designation as beneficiary had been revoked. She had none. Thus, it was
reasonable for Provident to assume that the revocation statute could apply and that
18
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it would be exposed to liability from other potential claimants if it paid the proceeds
to Dawneen.
The reasonableness of Provident' s conclusions - that the revocation statute
may apply and that it may be exposed to double or multiple liability if it paid the
proceeds to Dawneen - is not negated by Dawneen' s contention that she was the
actual "owner" of the Policy. First, she never raised this contention during any of
the back and forth correspondence with Provident while her claim was being
considered. She only made an issue of ownership after the Complaint in lnterpleader
had already been filed. Second, her contention was merely a contention and was
contradicted by Provident' s records, all of which showed Keith as the Policy owner.
From the very beginning, Keith was identified on the Application as the "Insured,"
and both the insurance Certificate and the Provident Group Policy documents state
that the "Insured" shall be the "Owner" unless changed at a later time. Dawneen
admits that she never submitted any such change request, even after having called
Provident in 2013 and been advised that Keith was the policy owner.
Even if Dawneen had raised the issue of her ownership of the Policy during
the claim administration process, Provident would have resolved that factual dispute
at its own peril. The law does not place such a burden on Provident, but permits
interpleader actions for precisely this reason - to permit the neutral payee to deposit
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the funds and then allow the various claimants to litigate such disputes amongst
themselves. See Lee v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The
protection afforded by interpleader takes several forms. Most significantly, it
prevents the stakeholder from being obliged to determine at its peril which claimant
has the better claim."). 1

b. lnterpleader was proper under Rule 22
Under Rule 22, an interpleader action is properly initiated when ''the plaintiff
is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability." Provident was in just such a
position when it received the life insurance claim from Dawneen, who identified
herself as the "ex-spouse" of the decedent. While it may have been clear to Dawneen

~

that the revocation statute did not apply, it appeared to Provident, based on its
records and after a thorough investigation, that the statute could apply. When

fil

Dawneen was further unable to produce any "governing instrument, court order, or

1

To the extent that Dawneen's brief can be read as challenging the fact that Provident's
records showed Keith as the owner of the Policy, she has not carried her burden of proof
and makes no attempt to marshal any evidence to challenge Provident's records. State v.
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 142 ("a party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the
evidence to support a verdict will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion
on appeal if it fails to marshal."). Even if she had, the argument is moot, because on
summary judgment the Trial Court made no attempt to decide the question of ownership
one way or the other, it merely decided, based on the documents available to Provident at
the time, that Provident's concerns regarding exposure to double or multiple liability
were reasonable. Whether Dawneen or another defendant would ultimately succeed in
establishing ownership of the Policy through litigation amongst themselves is irrelevant
to the question of whether Provident's decision to interplead was reasonable at the time.
20
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a contract relating to the division of the marital estate" supporting her claim to the
proceeds, Provident reasonably concluded that the revocation statute could apply
and that it may be exposed to liability from other interested persons if simply paid
the proceeds to Dawneen.

c. Interpleader was also separately authorized under Utah Code §
75-2-804(7)(b)

Provident's actions were reasonable not only under Rule 22, but also under
Utah Code § 75-2-804(7)(b), which specifically relates to the position in which
Provident was placed. That section expressly authorizes an insurer, having received
"written notice of the divorce'' to "pay any amount owed . . . to or with the court,"
whereupon ''the court shall hold the funds . . . and, upon its determination of this
section, shall order disbursement or transfer in accordance with the determination."
Based on its investigation and the documents contained in its files, Provident had a
reasonable basis to conclude that the revocation statute may apply and therefore it
properly interpleaded the claim and deposited the :funds with the Clerk of Court, just
as the statute invited it to do.

21
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II.

Dawneen's Arguments Under Utah Code §31A-22-413 Were Not
Preserved at the Trial Level and are Contrary to Controlling Case
Law.

Dawneen' s only other argument - that Provident breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing by "disregarding" Utah Code § 3 lA-22-413 which exempts
life insurance policies from the automatic revocation statute - was not properly
preserved at the Trial Court, and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.
Dawneen never raised the subject of§ 31A-22-413 during the claim administration
process, in any of the summary judgment briefing, at oral argument, or in her motion

GbJ

for reconsideration. The only time § 3 lA-22-413 was discussed was in the context
of the post-summary judgment dispute over the payment of Provident's attorneys'
fees, which had nothing to do with the merits on summary judgment and was not
even decided until after this appeal was filed.
Those arguments, being mis-placed, and never properly presented during any
of the summary judgment briefing or argument, should not be considered on appeal.

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993) ("As a general rule, appellate
courts will not consider an issue ... raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial
court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances.")
(citations omitted). The Appellate Court's review should be limited to Dawneen's
contention that § 75-2-804 does not apply because she (not Keith) was the "owner"
of the policy. See Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 3 78, ,I 57 (on appeal of summary
22
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judgment, Court of Appeals refused to consider argument that was not specifically
raised with citation to authority at the summary judgment stage).
Even if the Trial Court had considered Dawneen's argument that§ 31A-22413 exempts life insurance policies from the automatic revocation statute, the
argument is without merit and was expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4. To understand the Hertzske decision,
some background is needed. Utah Code§ 3 lA-22-413 is part of the Insurance Code
and sets forth rules regarding what restrictions may be placed in a life insurance
policy or annuity contract relating to the changing of a beneficiary. Utah Code § 303-5 is part of the Husband and Wife laws and deals with the contents of divorce
decrees. In 2013, the legislature enacted several changes to how life insurance and
annuity contracts are handled in the context of a divorce. See 2013 HB 65 Enrolled.
Language was added into § 31A-22-413(2)(a) that says: "Notwithstanding Section
75-2-804 [the automatic revocation statute], the insurer discharges its obligation
under the insurance policy ... if it pays the properly designated beneficiary unless it
has actual notice of an assignment or a change in beneficiary ... " Language was also
added into Utah Code§ 30-3-5(1)(e) requiring that if either party to a divorce owns
a life insurance policy or annuity contract, the decree must include language
indicating that the owner has reviewed the beneficiaries, made any necessary

23

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

changes, and affirms that the currently stated beneficiaries are still intended to be the
beneficiaries after the divorce is final.
Dawneen attempts to read§ 31A-22-413(2)(a) in isolation, and asserts that
the new language added in 2013 exempts life insurance policies from the automatic
revocation statute. But the Hertzske decision says§ 31A-22-413(2)(a) must be read
in the context of the changes to § 30-3-5. If a judge issuing a divorce decree
implements§ 30-3-5(l)(e) and has the parties confirm that the beneficiaries of their
life insurance policies are still intended to be the beneficiaries after the divorce is
final, then the language in§ 31A-22-413(2)(a) applies and "reverses the presumption
created in section 75-2-804 that the former spouse is revoked as a beneficiary on a
life insurance policy in divorce proceedings." Hertzske, 2017 UT 4 at ,r 11. But this
occurs "only when the statutory language of§ 30-3-5{l)(e) is expressly included in
the decree of the divorce." Id. at ,r 12 (emphasis in original).
In other words, § 75-2-804 creates a rebuttable presumption that a beneficiary
designation of a fonner spouse on a life insurance policy is revoked upon divorce
and this presumption can be rebutted by any of the means stated in§ 75-2-804(2)2,
or by inclusion in the divorce decree of the statutory language found§ 30-3-5(l){e).

Id at iI18 & 12. Where, as here, the divorce decree fails to mention the life insurance
2

"by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to
the division of the marital estate ... "
24
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policy, the presumption of revocation remains. Thus, Dawneen's new argument is
incorrect and would not have dictated a different outcome on summary judgment.

m.

Because the Claim was Properly Interpleaded, the Trial Court
Correctly Dismissed Dawneen's Counterclaims and Discharged
Provident of Liability With Respect to the Deposited Funds.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804(7) provides protections for third party payors who
make payments to the wrong person because they had no notice of the divorce, or
who, having received notice of the divorce, interplead funds with the court:
(7)(a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a
payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a
beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by a divorce,
annulment, or remarriage, or for having taken any other action in good
faith reliance on the validity of the governing instrument, before the
payor or other third party received written notice of the divorce,
annulment, or remarriage. A payor or other third party is liable for a
payment made or other action taken after the payor or other third party
received written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this
section.
(b) Written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage under
Subsection (7)(a) shall be mailed to the payor's or other third party's
main office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, or served upon the payor or other third party in the same
manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice
of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage, a payor or other third
party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item of
property held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the
probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estate or, if no
proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having
jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to the decedent's estates
located in the county of the decedent's residence. The court shall hold
the funds or item of property and, upon its determination under this
25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gi)

section, shall order disbursement or transfer in accordance with the
determination. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the
court discharge the payor or other third party from all claims for
the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or
deposited with the court.
(emphasis added). In this case, Provident received notice of Dawneen and Keith's
divorce and of Keith's remarriage to Margene, and conducted a diligent investigation
to confirm that there were no court orders, contracts, or other governing documents
that would entitle Dawneen to the proceeds despite the statutory revocation of her
beneficiary status. Having found none, Provident followed the steps set forth in 7 (b)
to interplead the funds with this Court.
Because Provident followed, in good faith, the provisions of§ 75-2-804(7)(b)
it is, pursuant to the statute, "discharged" of liability with respect to the policy and
Dawneen' s claims against Provident are barred.
This result, dictated by the Utah Probate Code, is consistent with the general
protections afforded to impartial interpleader plaintiffs. Utah's interpleader rule,
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is substantively identical to the federal
counterpart, Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The general rule across
the country is that impartial plaintiffs who bring proper interpleader actions are
entitled to "interpleader protection" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 22, which shields them
from any liability relating to the interpleaded claim, including counterclaims. See
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e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. Alpert, 10 F.Supp.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
("Since the Trustees in bringing their interpleader action thus acted within the rights
granted to them by law, counterclaims cannot be grounded upon adherence to such
statutorily authorized procedures.") (citations omitted); Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmer.
v. Hovis, 553 F .3d 258 (3 rd Cir. 2009) (dismissing counterclaims against interpleader
plaintiff as a matter of law because the interpleader plaintiff, "having brought an
appropriate interpleader action" is entitled to "interpleader protection" under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 22, which "shields it from any liability relating to those claims."); Reliance

Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Winiarski, 2012 WL 1564540 (W.D. Penn. 2012)
~

(dismissing claims against interpleading party as a matter of law where it was
blameless with respect. to the existence of conflicting claims to the proceeds and
properly instituted an interpleader action). Utah's Rule 22 and the protections
expressly afforded under Utah Code Ann.§ 75-2-804(7)(b) are consistent with this
uniform approach.
Interpleading money into court for determination of the rightful owner,
pursuant to an express statutory authority, cannot give rise to a claim of intentional
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infliction of emotional distress, 3 conversion,4 punitive damages, 5 misrepresentation,6
negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 7 breach of good faith and fair
dealing, 8 or breach of contract. 9 This is particularly so, given that all of the funds

3

The first element of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is the
defendant's intentional engagement in "some conduct toward the plaintiff considered
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency
and morality." Nelson v. Target Corp., 2014 UT App. 205, iJ 20. As a matter oflaw,
following a statutory directive to interplead funds is not "outrageous" or "intolerable,"
but is directly in line with generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
4
"A conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful
justification ... A basic requirement of conversion is that there be a wrongful exercise of
control over personal property in violation of the rights of its owner." Bonnie & Hyde,
Inc. v. Lynch, 2013 UT App. 153, iJ 30. As a matter of law, the statutory invitation
coupled with the plain language of the policy documents and the other undisputed facts,
provided Provident with a lawful justification to interplead the funds. Moreover,
Provident has not exercised control over the funds, but has paid them into the court for
the defendants to litigate amongst themselves.
5
Dawneen's only potential basis for punitive damages would be under Utah Code§ 78B8-201, which allows for such damages only in the event of"willful and malicious or
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others." As a matter of law,
Provident's decision to follow a statutory directive to interplead funds does not give rise
to such a claim.
6
As a matter of law, Provident's decision to interplead the fund rather than attempt to
interpret a statute at its peril does not tum its contractual terms into misrepresentations.
7
Claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress both require a
breach of a duty that Provident owed to Dawneen. But as a matter of law, Provident had
no duty to interpret any statute at the risk of subjecting itself to double or multiple
liability. To the contrary, Provident had express authority to avoid such a risk by
interpleading the funds.
8 As a matter of law, the statutory invitation, coupled with the plain language of the
policy documents and the other undisputed facts, provided Provident with a reasonable
and good faith basis to interplead the funds.
9 As a matter of law, Provident had no contractual duty to interpret the statute in
Dawneen's favor and indeed the specimen contract documents are the best evidence of
Provident's good faith and reasonableness in interpleading the funds because the
specimen documents clearly identify Keith as the owner of the policy.
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were ultimately distributed to Dawn.eert, after having been fairly litigated in the
interpleader prQcess. Thus, the Trial Court properly dis.missed Dawneen's
counterclaims and discharged Provident from liability with -respect to the Policy
because .Provident played no role in creating the competing claims ·and filed a proper
interpleader action.

CONCLUSION
Provident followed the $tatute to· the letter~ doing exactly what Utah Co.de §

75~2-804(7)(b) ·invites

an insurer to do wh¢n -confronted with a claim from an ex.;.

spouse. Havin$ properly interpleaded the claim. and deposited the funds with the
Cl.erk of Court, Provident was entitled to be discharged from liability with respect to
the ,Policy proceeds

and was protected from

any

counterclaims. that

ate grounded

upon its adherence to such statutorily authorized procedures·. The Trial Court's
decision. on summary judgment should therefore be upheld.
DATED this 20th day of September, 2018.

FABIAN VANCOTT

-~~

Clirit R. Hansen

Scott M. Petersen
Attorneys for Provident Life and.Accident
Insurance Company
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Matthew H. Raty, 663 5
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Telephone: (801) 495-2252
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Dawneen Wirtz
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to U .R.A.P. 24(g), Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Provident Life and
Accident Insurance Company, hereby certifies that the foregoing brief contains a
proportionally spaced 14-point typeface and contains 7,336 words, as determined by
an automatic word count feature on Microsoft Word 2013, including headings and
footnotes, and excluding the table of contents, table of authorities, and ad~endum.
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Isl Clint R. Hansen
Clint R. Hansen
Scott M. Petersen
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

31

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
The Order Under Review:
A. Order Granting Interpleader Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, For
Discharge, and for Attorney Fees and Costs.
Statutes and Cases of Central Importance
B. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 22
C. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804
D. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
E. Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-22-413

F. HB 264 Enrolled (2013)
G. Hertzscke v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4
Documents From the Administrative Record Showing Keith as Owner of the Policy
H. Memorandum of Insurance, R. 274

I. Policy Data Sheets, R. 276-278
J. Letter of August 14, 2013, R. 458
K. Insurance Certificate, R. 281-283, at 282 (Defining "Owner'' as "Insured").

L. Provident Group Policy, R. 285-296, at 287 (Identifying Keith as "Owner"),
288 (Defining "Owner" as "Insured"), and at 294 (Application, identifying
Keith as "Insured")
~

32

0D

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

M. Record of August 7, 2013 phone call, R. 454
N. Record of October 24, 2013 phone call, R. 456
(i)
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEC 19 2016
Salt Lake County.at

By: _ _ _ _ _0ep~;.,uty...:;fae-r1c

PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
. Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING INTERPLEADER
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ST.Jl\lMARY JUDGMENT, FOR
DISCHARGE, AND FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

vs.
DAWNEEN G. WIRTZ, MARGENE
TAYLOR WIRTZ, and THE ESTATE OF
KEITH T. WIRTZ,

Case No. 160900031
Defendants.
Judge Laura S. Scott
DAWNEENG. WIRTZ,

December 19, 2016

Counterclaim Plaintiff,

vs.
PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Counterclaim Defendant.
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, for Discharge, and for Attorney's
Fees (Motion) filed by interpleader plaintiff Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company
(Provident). The Motion was fully briefed by the parties and oral argument was held on
September 14, 2016.

Provident was represented by Clint R. Hansen of Fabian VanCott,

Defendant Dawneen 0. Wirtz (Dawneen) was represented by Matthew H. Raty of the Law
Office of Matthew H. Raty, PC, and Defendants Margene Taylor Wirtz (Margene) and The
Estate of Keith T. Wirtz (Estate) were represented by David A. VanDyke of VanDyke Legal

1
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Services. 1 After considering the briefs, exhibits, applicable law, and arguments of counsel, the
Court issued its oral ruling granting the Motion at the conclusion of the hearing.
As directed by the Court, counsel for Provident prepared a proposed Order, which was

served on the other parties. Counsel for Margene and the Estate approved the Order as to form.
Dawneen filed an objection to the proposed Order. Provident filed a response to the objection.
The proposed Order was submitted for decision on November 21, 2016. After reviewing the
parties' submissions, the Court hereby enters the following Order on the Motion:

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
For pmposes of the Motion, the following material facts are undisputed:
1.

On September 29, 1989, an agent of Provident came to Dawneen's work and

offered her life insurance products. Dawneen alleges the agent told her that she could buy a life
insurance policy that would insure the life of her husband and make her the beneficiary of the

policy in the event of his death. Dawneen alleges the agent also told her that "she was the owner
of the policy and that she would have to keep the premiums current to maintain the policy.''

2.

That same day, Dawneen signed an application for a life insurance policy to

Provident. The application identified "Keith T. Wirtz" as the proposed insured and ''Dawneen

Wirtz, wife" as the beneficiary. Dawneen signed the application as the proposed insured.
3.

On January 1, 1990, Provident issued policy number 029001795 in the base

amount of $75,000.
4.

On August 28, 1990, Dawneen and Keith were divorced. Keith married Margene

on December 1, 1990 and they remained married until his death on January 3, 2015.
1 Because they share the same last name and to avoid confusion, the Court will refer to the parties as Dawneen,
Margene, and Keith. No disrespect to the parties is intended.

2
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S.

From January 1, 1990 through January 3, 2015, the date of Keith's death,

Dawneen paid all the premiums for the policy.

6.

On or about January 23, 2015, Dawneen submitted a Claimant's Statement, a

copy of Keith's death certificate, and a copy of the group term certificate to Provident In the
relationship to the deceased section of the Claimant's Statement, Dawneen identified herself as
"ex-wife."
7.

On or about February 3, 2015, Provident sent a letter to Dawneen requesting

additional information that it needed to continue its review. The letter stated:
The State of Utah has certain laws that mandate that the rights of a
spouse to the proceeds of a life insmance policy are terminated
. upon divorce, unless the divorce decree states the former spouse is
entitled to the proceeds, or the insured re-designates the former
spouse as beneficiary. Please provide a copy of the divorce decree
and property settlement or other proof that you are entitled to the
proceeds of this policy.

8.
9.

Dawneen did not respond to the February 3n1 letter.
. On or about February 27, 2015, Provident sent a second letter to Dawneen

requesting the divorce decree and property settlement or other proof that she was entitled the
proceeds of the policy. Dawneen did not respond to the February 27th letter.
10.

On or about March 10, 2015, Provident sent a third letter to Dawneen. On or

about April 2, ·2015, Provident sent a fourth letter to Dawneen.
11.

On or about March 30, 2015, Dawneen sent a letter to Provident enclosing a copy

of the Decree of Divorce, the Order on Petition to Modify and Judgment, the life insurance
application, and pay stubs and cancelled checks showing that she had paid the premiums for the
policy. In the "letter, Dawneen stated that there was no property settlement from the divorce, that

3
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the beneficiary designation was not changed after the divorce, and that she had paid the
premiums for 28 years in good faith. Neither the Decree of Divorce nor the Order on Petition to
Modify and Judgment mention life insurance or the policy.

12.

On April 16, 2015, Provident sent another letter to Dawneen requesting additional

information it needed in order to continue its review. Specifically, Provident requested a copy of
''the Property Settlement Agreement that provides proof that you are entitled to the proceeds of

~

this policy."
13.

On July 23, 2015, Provident sent a letter to Dawneen, which states in relevant part

as follows:
Unfortunately, it appears that your designation as beneficiary of
· this policy has been revoked by statute. Under the Utah Probate
Code, the designation of a spouse as beneficiary of a life insurance
policy is revoked upon divorce of the spouses.
Should you wish to provide any additional information that may
support your entitlement, please provide this to us within 20 days
from the date of this letter.
~

· The Company's decision is based on the information in our file ...
If you have additional information that you believe may affect our
decision, please forward it to us for review.
If additional information is provided, we expressly reserve our
rights to continue the review of the claim. We will promptly
review and evaluate the claim upon receipt of the required
documents ...

14.

During this period of time, Provident' s internal records identified Keith as the

"owner" of the policy.
15.

Also during this period of time, Provident was unable to locate the actual group

master policy and assembled a specimen group insurance policy, which it provided to Dawneen.

4
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16.

. On August 10, 2015, counsel for Dawneen sent a letter to Provident, which states

in relevant part as follows:
I note that you have not provided a citation of section or subsection
of the Utah Probate Code in support of your assertion. My initial
review demonstrates that there is no basis to deny Mrs. Wirtz
[Dawneen] the benefits of the contract she has with your company,
· a contract for which she alone paid premiums for 27 years. Please
set forth, promptly, the complete basis of your assertion that Mrs.
Wutz's beneficiary designation is revoked.

~

17.

On September 8, 2015, Provident sent a letter to cowisel for Dawneen, which

states in relevant part as follows:
· In your recent correspondence, you requested the specific statute
on which our denial was based. We based this information on
Utah Probate Code statute 75-2-804. The Company's decision is
based on the information in our file ... If you have additional
information that you believe may affect our decision, please
forward it to us for review ...

18.

On January 5, 2016, Provident filed this interpleader action and interpleaded the

$75,000 with the Court. Provident named and served Margene and the Estate as defendants.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the above undisputed material facts, the Court makes the following conclusions
of law:
1.

The only issue addressed in this Order is whether Provident properly interpleaded

the $75,000 proceeds from the life insurance policy and whether Dawneen's counterclaims
against Provident should be dismissed.
2.

. While both parties agree that Keith was the insured and that Dawneen was the

designated beneficiary under the policy, there is a material dispute regarding ownership of the
policy, which the court does not resolve at this time.

s
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3.

Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[p]ersons having

claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and be required to interplead when their
claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability."
4.

~

· The Court concludes that Provident properly filed this interpleader action and

interpleaded the proceeds because it reasonably believed that it may be exposed to double or
multiple liability.
5.

Although Dawneen alleges that it is clear under Utah Code § 75-2..804(2) and the

life insurance application that she is the owner of the policy and therefore the only one entitled to
the proceeds, the Court does not find that such a conclusion was clear based on the information
that was available to Provident at the time it issued its denial.
6.

Based on its review of the documentation provided by Dawneen, Provident

reasonably believed that it may be subject to double or multiple liability because the beneficiary
designation may have been automatically revoked pursuant to Utah Code § 75-2-804(2).

7.

Because its filing of this interpleader action was permissible, Provident is entitled

to be discharged from this case as a matter of law.
8.

Dawneen asserts counterclaims against Provident for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, conversion, misrepresentation, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
9.

Each of these counterclaims is predicated on Dawneen' s allegation that Provident

acted negligently and/or in bad faith when it initially denied her claim and then filed this
interpleader action, thereby creating the present dispute with Margene and the Estate, who did
not know about the policy or pay any of the premiums for the policy.

6
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10.

Dawneen cites Lee v. West Coast, 688 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) as support for her

counterclaims. However, the Court finds that this case is distinguishable. In West Coast, the
insurance company negligently failed to have the proper owner sign the change of beneficiary
form. Dawneen does not allege any similar negligent conduct by Provident
11.
Gi

Rather, Dawneen simply disagrees with Provident's interpretation of Utah Code

§ 75-2-804(2) - including whether it applies when the ex-spouse applied for the life insurance

policy, signed the application as the insured, and paid all of the premiums - and Provident's
decision to interplead the proceeds under rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
12.

Moreover, once Provident decided to file an interpleader action, it was required to

notify all parties with a potential interest in the proceeds, including Margene and the Estate.
13.

~

The Court concludes that in the absence of specific facts that would support an

inference that Provident' s initial denial of her claim or its decision to file this interpleader action
was made in bad faith, Dawneen's counterclaims fail as a matter of law. Indeed, if the Court

determines that the statute applies, Provident cannot be liable for following it and denying her
claim. If the Court determines that the statute does not apply, then the proceeds will be paid to
Dawneen.
14.

With respect to Provident's request for attorney fees and costs, Dawneen does not

dispute that an interpleader is generally entitled to reasonable attorney fees related to the filing of
the interpleader action. Although there may be circumstances where an interpleader is not
entitled to attorney fees, such circumstances are not present in this case. 2

2

See Capson v. Bisbois, 592 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah 1979) (attorney fees and costs may denied when interpleader did
not act as a disinterested stakeholder or when the interpleader, through its own fault, created the conflicting claims).

7
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15.

More specifically, Provident did not, through its own fault, cause the conflicting

claims necessitating the filing of this interpleader action. Nor has Provident been an active
participant in the litigation or taken a position on the merits.
16.

. Thus, the Court awards Provident reasonable attorney fees and costs related to the

filing of this action, which will be determined after Provident serves an affidavit of attorney fees
and costs on Dawneen, who will be given an opportunity to challenge the amount of the

~

requested fees and costs.3

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Dawneen Wirtz's counterclaims against Provident
are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
A.

Provident is dismissed as a party to the case and discharged from liability for the

interpleaded funds.
B.

Provident is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs related to the filing

of this action, which may be paid from the interpleaded funds which are currently on deposit
with the Court at the conclusion of this action.
Dated this

J1!.. day of December, 2016.

~

3

Dawneen argues that Provident is not entitled to costs because the Court did not specifically reference costs in its
oral ruling. While true, the case law relied on by both parties state that an interpleader is entitled to both attorney
fees and costs.

8
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RULE 22. INTERPLEAOER, UT R RCP Rule 22

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annas)

Part IV. Parties
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 22
~

RULE 22. INTERPLEADER

Currentness
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are
such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objecting to the joinder
that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not have a common origin or are
not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole
or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way
of cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties
permitted in Rule 20.

Notes of Decisions (28)

lij}

Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 22, UT R RCP Rule 22
Current with amendments received through August 15, 2018
End of Dot-un1ent
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§ 75-2-804. Definitions-Revocation of probate and nonprobate .••, UT ST§ 75-2-804

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 75. Utah Uniform Probate Code (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 2. Intestate Succession and Wills (Refs & Annos)
Part 8. General Provisions (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A 1953 § 75-2-804
§ 75-2-804. Definitions-Revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers by divorce-

Effect of severance-Revival-Protection of payors, third parties, and bona fide purchasers-Personal liability of recipient-No revocation by other changes of circumstances
Currentness
(1) As used in this section:

(a) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a
beneficiary designated in a governing instrument.

(b) "Divorce or annulment,, means any divorce or annulment, or any dissolution or declaration of invalidity of a
marriage, that would exclude the spouse as a surviving spouse within the meaning of Section 75-2-802. A decree of
separation that does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section.

(c) "Divorced individual" includes an individual whose marriage has been annulled.

(d) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by the divorced individual before the divorce or
annulment of the individual's marriage to the individual's former spouse.

(e) "Relative of the divorced individual's former spouse" means an individual who is related to the divorced individual's
former spouse by blood, adoption, or affinity and who, after the divorce or annulment, is not related to the divorced
individual by blood, adoption, or affinity.

(f) "Revocable," with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination, means one under which the
divorced individual, at the time of the divorce or annulment, was alone empowered, by law or under the governing
instrument, to cancel the designation in favor of the individual's former spouse or former spouse's relative, whether
or not the divorced individual was then empowered to designate another in place of the individual's former spouse or
in place of the individual's former spouse's relative and whether or not the divorced individual then had the capacity
to exercise the power.

(2) Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division
of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the
divorce or annulment of a marriage:
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(a) revokes any revocable:

(i) disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a
governing instrument and any disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative
of the divorced individual's former spouse;

(ii) provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the divorced
individual's former spouse or on a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse; and

(iii) nomination in a governing instrument, which nominates a divorced individual's former spouse or a relative of
the divorced individual's former spouse to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal
representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardian; and

~

(b) severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of the divorce or annulment as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the former spouses into tenancies in common.

(3) A severance under Subsection (2)(b) does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired for value and in good
faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship in the survivor of the former spouses unless a writing declaring the
severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the property,
which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such property, as evidence of ownership.

(4) Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse
disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative
capacity, as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the divorce or annulment.

(5) Provisions revoked solely by this section are revived by the divorced individual's remarriage to the former spouse or
by a nullification of the divorce or annulment.

(6) No change of circumstances other than as described in this section and in Section 75-2-803 effects a revocation.
~

(7)(a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any
other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by a divorce, annulment, or remarriage, or
for having taken any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of the governing instrument, before the payor
or other third party received written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage. A payor or other third party is
liable for a payment made or other action taken after the payor or other third party received written notice of a claimed
forfeiture or revocation under this section.

(b) Written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage under Subsection (7)(a) shall be mailed to the payor's or
other third party's main office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or served upon the
payor or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of the
divorce, annulment, or remarriage, a payor or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any
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item of property held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent's
estate or, if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings
relating to the decedent's estates located in the county of the decedent's residence. The court shall hold the funds or
item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement or transfer in accordance
with the determination. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the payor or other third
party from all claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court.

(8)(a) A person who purchases property from a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person for value
and without notice, or who receives from a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person a payment
or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this
section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, nor is liable under this section for the amount of the payment
or the value of the item of property or benefit. But a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or other person who,
not for value, received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled under this
section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the
payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section.

(b) If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property,
or any other benefit covered by this section, a former spouse, relative of the former spouse, or any other person who,
not for value, received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled under
this section is obligated to return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of
the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this
section or part of this section not preempted.

Credits
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 84, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2013, c. 264, § 3, eff. May 14, 2013.

Editors' Notes

UNIFORM LAW COMMENTS[UPC § 2-804)
Purpose and Scope of Revision. The revisions of this section, pre-1990 Section 2-508, intend to unify the law of probate
and nonprobate transfers. As originally promulgated, pre-1990 Section 2-508 revoked a predivorce devise to the testator's
former spouse. The revisions expand the section to cover "will substitutes" such as revocable inter-vivos trusts, lifeinsurance and retirement-plan beneficiary designations, transfer-on-death accounts, and other revocable dispositions to
the former spouse that the divorced individual established before the divorce (or annulment). As revised, this section
also effects a severance of the interests of the former spouses in property that they held at the time of the divorce (or
annulment) as joint tenants with the right of survivorship; their co-ownership interests become tenancies in common.
As revised, this section is the most comprehensive provision of its kind, but many states have enacted piecemeal
legislation tending in the same direction. For example, Michigan and Ohio have statutes transforming spousal joint
tenancies in land into tenancies in common upon the spouses' divorce. Mich.Comp.Laws Ann.§ 552.102; Ohio Rev.Code
Ann. § 5302.20(c)(5). Ohio, Oklahoma, and Tennessee have recently enacted legislation effecting a revocation of
provisions for the settlor's former spouse in revocable inter-vivos trusts. Ohio Rev.Code Ann.§ 1339.62; Okla.Stat.Ann.
tit. 60, § 175; Tenn.Code Ann. § 35-50-5115 (applies to revocable and irrevocable inter-vivos trusts). Statutes in
Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas relate to the consequence of divorce on life-insurance and retirement-plan
beneficiary designations. Mich.Comp.Laws Ann.§ 552.101; Ohio Rev.Code Ann.§ 1339.63; Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, §
178; Tex.Fam.Code§§ 3.632-.633.
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The courts have also come under increasing pressure to use statutory construction techniques to extend statutes like
the pre-1990 version of Section 2-508 to various will substitutes. In Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass.1985),
the Massachusetts court held the statute applicable to a revocable inter-vivos trust, but restricted its "holding to the
particular facts of this case-specifically the existence of a revocable pour-over trust funded entirely at the time of the
decedent's death." 473 N.E.2d at 1093. The trust in that case was an unfunded life-insurance trust; the life insurance was
employer-paid life insurance. In Miller v. First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 637 P.2d 75 (Okla.1981), the court also held such
a statute to be applicable to an unfunded life-insurance trust. The testator's will devised the residue of his estate to the
trustee of the life-insurance trust. Despite the absence of meaningful evidence of intent to incorporate, the court held
that the pour-over devise incorporated the life-insurance trust into the will be reference, and thus was able to apply the
revocation-upon-divorce statute. In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Stitzel, 1 Pa.Fiduc.2d 316 (C.P.1981), however,
the court held a statute similar to the pre-1990 version of Section 2-508 to be inapplicable to effect a revocation of a lifeinsurance beneficiary designation of the former spouse.

'iv

~

Revoking Benefits of the Former Spouse's Relatives. In several cases, including Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084
(Mass.1985), and Estate of Coffed, 38 7 N .E.2d 1209 (N. Y .1979), the result of treating the former spouse as if he or she
predeceased the testator was that a gift in the governing instrument was triggered in favor of relatives of the former
spouse who, after the divorce, were no longer relatives of the testator. In the Massachusetts case, the former spouse's
nieces and nephews ended up with an interest in the property. In the New York case, the winners included the former
spouse's child by a prior marriage. For other cases to the same effect, see Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa 1979);
Bloom v. Selfon, 555 A.2d 75 (Pa.1989); Estate of Graef, 368 N.W.2d 633 (Wis.1985). Given that, during divorce process
.or in the aftermath of the divorce, the former spouse's relatives are likely to side with the former spouse, breaking down or
weakening any former ties that may previously have developed between the transferor and the former spouse's relatives,
seldom would the transferor have favored such a result. This section, therefore, also revokes these gifts.
Consequence of Revocation. The effect of revocation by this section is that the provisions of the governing instrument are
given effect as if the divorced individual's former spouse (and relatives of the former spouse) disclaimed all provisions
revoked by this section (see Section 2-1106 for the effect of a disclaimer). Note that this means that the antilapse statute
applies in appropriate cases in which the divorced individual or relative is treated as having disclaimed. In the case of
a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, the provisions of the governing instrument are given
effect as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the divorce or annulment. If
the divorced individual (or relative of the divorced individual) is the donee of an unexercised power of appointment that
is revoked by this section, the gift-in-default clause, if any, is to take effect, to the extent that the gift-in-default clause
is not itself revoked by this section .
.ERISA Preemption of State Law. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) federalizes pension
and employee benefit law. Section 514(a) of BRISA, 29 U.S.C. § l 144(a), provides that the provisions of Titles I and IV
of BRISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan" governed by BRISA.
ERISA's preemption clause is extraordinarily broad. ERISA Section 514(a) does not merely preempt state laws that
conflict with specific provisions in BRISA. Section 514(a) preempts "any and all State laws" insofar as they "relate to"
any ERISA-govemed employee benefit plan.
A complex case law has arisen concerning the question of whether to apply BRISA Section 514(a) to preempt state
law in circumstances in which BRISA supplies no substantive regulation. For example, until 1984, BRISA contained
no authorization for the enforcement of state domestic relations decrees against pension accounts, but the federal
courts were virtually unanimous in refusing to apply BRISA preemption against such state decrees. See, e.g., American

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

§ 75-2-804. Definitions-Revocation of probate and nonprobate •.• , UT ST§ 75-2-804

Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.1979). The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 amended ERISA
to add Sections 206(d)(3) and 514(b)(7), confirming the judicially created exception for state domestic relations decrees.
The federal courts have been less certain about whether to defer to state probate law. In Board of Trustees of Western
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. H.F. Johnson, Inc., 830 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir.1987), the court held that
ERISA preempted the Montana nonclaim statute (which is Section 3-803 of the Uniform Probate Code). On the other
hand, in Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees, 709 F .Supp. 329 (E.D .N.Y .1989), the court applied the New York "slayerrule" against an ERISA preemption claim, reasoning that "state laws prohibiting murderers from receiving death benefits
are relatively uniform [and therefore] there is little threat of creating a 'patchwork scheme of regulations' "that ERISA
sought to avoid.

It is to be hoped that the federal courts will continue to show sensitivity to the primary role of state law in the field
of probate and nonprobate transfers. To the extent that the federal courts think themselves unable to craft exceptions
to ERISA's preemption language, it is open to them to apply state law concepts as federal common law. Because the
Uniform Probate Code contemplates multistate applicability, it is well suited to be the model for federal common law
absorption.
Another avenue of reconciliation between ERISA preemption and the primacy of state law in this field is envisioned in
subsection (h)(2) of this section. It imposes a personal liability for pension payments that pass to a former spouse or
relative of a former spouse. This provision respects ERISA's concern that federal law govern the administration of the
plan, while still preventing unjust enrichment that would result if an unintended beneficiary were to receive the pension
benefits. Federal law has no interest in working a broader disruption of state probate and nonprobate transfer law than
is required in the interest of smooth administration of pension and employee benefit plans.

Cross References. See Section 1-201 for definitions of "beneficiary designated in a governing instrument," "governing
instrument," "joint tenants with the right of survivorship," "community property with the right of survivorship," and
"payor."
References. The theory ofthis section is discussed in Waggoner, "Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The
Revised Uniform Probate Code," 26 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 683, 689-701 (1992). See also Langbein, "The Nonprobate
Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession," 97 Harv.L.Rev. 1108 (1984).
Historical Note. This Comment was revised in 1993 and 2002.
2002 Amendment Relating to Disclaimers. In 2002, the Code's former disclaimer provision (§ 2-801) was replaced by the
Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, which is incorporated into the Code as Part 11 of Article 2 (§§ 2-1101 to
2-1117). The statutory references in this Comment to former section 2-801 have been replaced by appropriate references
to Part 11. Updating these statutory references has not changed the substance of this Comment.
1997 Technical Amendment. For an explanation of the 1997 technical amendment, which added the word "equal" to
subsection (b)(2), see the Comment to Section 2-803.

Notes of Decisions (8)
U.C.A. 1953 § 75-2-804, UT ST§ 75-2-804
Current through 2018 General Session.
f.nd of Docomtnc
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§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of•••, UT ST § 30-3-5

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 30. Husband and Wife
Chapter 3. Divorce (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of parties and
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction--Custody and
parent-time-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for modification

Effective: May 8, 2018
Currentness
~

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:

(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
a dependent child including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, coinsurance, and deductibles;

(b)(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of

appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for a dependent child; and

(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, or dental
insurance plan is secondary in accordance with Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent
child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;

(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:

(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the
parties contracted or incurred during marriage;

(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts,
obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and

(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;

(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services; and

(e) if either party owns a life insurance policy or an annuity contract, an acknowledgment by the court that the owner:
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(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries;

(ii) has affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce becomes
final; and

(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the policy or contrac~ the beneficiaries currently listed will receive
any funds paid by the insurance company under the terms of the policy or contract.

(2) The court may include, in an order determining child suppor~ an order assigning financial responsibility for all or
a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of a dependent child, necessitated by the employment or training of
the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent child would
be adequately cared for, the court may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent child, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.

(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of a child and the
child's support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as
is reasonable and necessary.

(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to a child born to the parents after entry of the decree
of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.

(S)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the
immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.

(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an order
establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.

(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorney fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court
determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.

(7) If a motion or petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a
grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party:

(a) actual attorney fees incurred;

(b) the costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation or parent-time, which may include:

2
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(i) court costs;

(ii) child care expenses;

(iii) transportation expenses actually incurred;
~

(iv) lost wages, if ascertainable; and

(v) counseling for a child or parent if ordered or approved by the court;

(c) make-up parent time consistent with the best interest of the child; and

(d) any other appropriate equitable remedy.

(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:

(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income, including the impact of diminished workplace
experience resulting from primarily caring for a child of the payor spouse;

(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

(iv) the length of the marriage;

(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of a minor child requiring support;

(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and

(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for
education received by the payor spouse or enabling the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.

(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms of the
alimony.

(c) "Fault" means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to the
breakup of the marriage relationship:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of•••, UT ST § 30-3-5

6w

(i) engaging in sexual relations with a person other than the party's spouse;

(ii) knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the other party or a minor child;

(iii) knowingly and intentionally causing the other party or a minor child to reasonably fear life-threatening harm; or

(iv) substantially undermining the fmancial stability of the other party or the minor child.

(d) The court may, when fault is at issue, close the proceedings and seal the court records.

(e) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining
alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in the court's discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In
marriages of short duration, when no child has been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider
the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.

(f) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.

(g) When a marriage oflong duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses

due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding
alimony.

(h) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no child has been conceived or born
during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the
marriage.

(i)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on
a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did
not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court fmds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.

(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as
provided in this Subsection (8).

(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
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(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payer's improper conduct
justifies that consideration.

(j) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at
any time before termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony
for a longer period of time.

(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party
to the action of annulment and the payor party's rights are determined.

(l0)(a) Subject to Subsection (lO)(b), an order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse, after the order for alimony is issued, cohabits with
another person, even if the former spouse is not cohabiting with another person when the party paying alimony files
the motion to terminate alimony.

(b) A party paying alimony to a former spouse may not seek termination of alimony under Subsection (lO)(a), later
than one year from the day on which the party knew or should have known that the former spouse has cohabited
with another person.

Credits
Laws 1909, c. 109, § 4; Laws 1969, c. 72, § 3; Laws 1975, c. 81, § 1; Laws 1979, c. 110, § 1; Laws 1984, c. 13, § 1; Laws
1985, c. 72, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 100, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 257, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 152, § l; Laws 1993, c. 261, § 1; Laws 1994,
c. 284, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 330, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 168, § 1, eff.
May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 277, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 255, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 176, § 3,
eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 129, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2010, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2013, c. 264,
§ 1, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2013, c. 373, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2017, c. 31, § 1, eff. May 9, 2017; Laws 2018, c.
89, § 1, eff. May 8, 2018; Laws 2018, c. 297, § 1, eff. May 8, 2018.

Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1212; C.L. 1907, § 1212; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933, § 40-3-5; C. 1943, § 40-3-5.

Notes of Decisions (1560)
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5, UT ST§ 30-3-5
Current through 2018 General Session.
~
End of Hucu111ent

© 2018 Thomson R~titers. No chi;n to original U.S. Government Works.
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 31a. Insurance Code
Chapter 22. Contracts in Specific Llnes
Part 4. Llfe Insurance and Annuities

U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-22-413
§ 31A-22-413. Designation of beneficiary

Currentness
(1) Subject to Subsection 31A-22-412(2), no life insurance policy or annuity contract may restrict the right of a
policyholder or certificate holder:

(a) to make an irrevocable designation of beneficiary effective immediately or at some subsequent time; or

(b) if the designation of beneficiary is not explicitly irrevocable, to change the beneficiary without the consent of the
previously designated beneficiary. Subsection 75_-6-20l(l)(c) applies to designations by will or by separate writing.

(2)(a) An insurer may prescribe formalities to be complied with for the change of beneficiaries, but those formalities may
only be designed for the protection of the insurer. Notwithstanding Section 75-2-804, the insurer discharges its obligation
under the insurance policy or certificate of insurance if it pays the properly designated beneficiary unless it has actual
notice of either an assignment or a change in beneficiary designation made pursuant to Subsection (l)(b).

(b) The insurer has actual notice if the formalities prescribed by the policy are complied with, or if the change in
beneficiary has been requested in the form prescribed by the insurer and delivered to an agent representing the insurer
at least three days prior to payment to the earlier properly designated beneficiary.

Credits
Laws 1985, c. 242, § 27; Laws 1986, c. 204, § 166; Laws 1999, c. 369, § 2, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2006, c. 62, § 1, eff. May
1, 2006; Laws 2013, c. 264, § 2, eff. May 14, 2013.
~

Notes of Decisions (3)
U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-22-413, UT ST§ 31A-22-413
Current through 2018 General Session.
End of Document
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INSURANCE BENEFICIARY CHANGES, 2013 Utah Laws Ch. 264 (H.B. 65)

2013 Utah Laws Ch. 264 (H.B. 65)
UTAH 2013 SESSION LAWS
60th LEGISLATURE, 2013 GENERAL SESSION
Additions are indicated by Text; deletions by
!fe,rt,

Vetoes are indicated by..!fe,ft- ;
stricken material b y ~ .
Ch.264

H.B.65
INSURANCE BENEFICIARY CHANGES

2013 GENERAL SESSION
STATE OF UTAH
Chief Sponsor: Jim Bird
Senate Sponsor: Wayne A. Harper

LONGTITLE
General Description:
This bill requires a life insurance or annuity policyholder to change a beneficiary according to the insurer's requirements
after a divorce or annulment.

Highlighted Provisions:
This bill:
. exempts life insurance policies and annuity contracts from the operation of Section 75-2-804;
. requires a policyholder or contract holder to follow the insurer's requirements for changing beneficiaries after a
divorce;
. requires a judge in a divorce to ask parties about insurance or annuities; and
. makes technical corrections.

Money Appropriated in this Bill:
None

Other Special Clauses:
None

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSURANCE BENEFICIARY CHANGES, 2013 Utah Laws Ch. 264 (H.B. 65)

Utah Code Sections Affected:
AMENDS:

30-3-5, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2010, Chapter 285
31A-22-413, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2006, Chapter 62
75-2-804, as repealed and reenacted by Laws of Utah 1998, Chapter 39
Be It enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

Section 1. Section 30-3-5 is amended to read:
<< UT ST§ 30-3-5 >>
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and
parent-time-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for modification
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:

(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, coinsurance, and deductibles;
(b)(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring th~ purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and

(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, or
dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if
at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the
parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court s division of debts,
obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
1

(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and

(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery ServiceS; ; and
(~) if either party owns a life insurance policy. or an annuity contract, an acknowledgment by the court that the owner:
(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries;
(µ) lias affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce becomes
final; and
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(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the policy or contract, the beneficiaries currently listed will receive

any funds paid by the insurance company under the terms of the policy or contract.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning fmancial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training
of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and
their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as
is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and father after entry of
the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the
immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.

(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an order
establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the
court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent
or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.

(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;

(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
{v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.

(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
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(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining
alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard ofliving that existed at the time of trial. In marriages
of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the
standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses
due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding
alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born
during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the
marriage.

(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on
a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that
did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that
action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payer may not be considered, except
as provided in this Subsection (8).

(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payer's improper
conduct justifies that consideration.

~
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any
time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony
for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party
to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.

Section 2. Section 31A-22-413 is amended to read:

<< UT ST§ 31A-22-413 >>
§ 31A-22-413. Designation of beneficiary

4
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(1) Subject to Subsection 31A-22-412(2), no life insurance policy or annuity contract may restrict the right of a
policyholder or certificate holder:
(a) to make an irrevocable designation of beneficiary effective immediately or at some subsequent time; or
(b) if the designation of beneficiary is not explicitly irrevocable, to change the beneficiary without the consent of the
previously designated beneficiary. Subsection 75-6-201(1)(c) applies to designations by will or by separate writing.
(2)(a) An insurer may prescribe formalities to be complied with for the change of beneficiaries, but those formalities
may only be designed for the protection of the insurer. =File Notwithstanding Section 75-2-804, the insurer discharges
its obligation under the insurance policy or certificate of insurance if it pays the properly designated beneficiary unless
it has actual notice of either an assignment or a change in beneficiary designation made pursuant to Subsection (1 )(b)
or Seetiofl 75 2 804 .

(b) The insurer has actual notice if the formalities prescribed by the policy are complied with, or if the change in
beneficiary has been requested in the form prescribed by the insurer and delivered to an agent representing the insurer
at least three days prior to payment to the earlier properly designated beneficiary.

Section 3. Section 75-2-804 is amended to read:

<< UT ST§ 75-2-804 >>
§ 75-2-804. Definitions-Revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers by divorce-Effect of severance

-Revival-Protection of payors, third parties, and bona fide purchasers-Personal liability of recipient
-No revocation by other changes of circumstances-No revocation of life insurance beneficiary
( 1) As used in this section:
(a) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a
beneficiary designated in a governing instrument.
(b) "Divorce or annulment" means any divorce or annulment, or any dissolution or declaration of invalidity of a
marriage, that would exclude the spouse as a surviving spouse within the meaning of Section 75-2-802. A decree of
separation that does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section.
(c) "Divorced individual" includes an individual whose marriage has been annulled.
(d) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by the divorced individual before the divorce or
annulment of Im the individual's marriage to Im the individual's former spouse.
(e) "Relative of the divorced individual's former spouse" means an individual who is related to the divorced individual's
former spouse by blood, adoption, or affinity and who, after the divorce or annulment, is not related to the divorced
individual by blood, adoption, or affinity.
(f) "Revocable," with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination, means one under which the
divorced individual, at the time of the divorce or annulment, was alone empowered, by law or under the governing
instrument, to cancel the designation in favor ofIm ffi'e individual's former spouse or former spouse's relative, whether
or not the divorced individual was then empowered to designate himself another in place ofms the individual's former
spouse or in place of his the individual's former spouse's relative and whether or not the divorced individual then had
the capacity to exercise the power.
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(2) Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division
of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the
divorce or annulment of a marriage:

~

(a) revokes any revocable:
(i) disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his the individual's form.er spouse
in a governing instrument and any disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a
relative of the divorced individual's former spouse;
(ii) provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the divorced
individual's former spouse or on a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse; and
(iii) nomination in a governing instrument, nominating which nominates a divorced individual's form.er spouse or
a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including
a personal representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardian; and
(b) severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of the divorce or annulment as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the form.er spouses into tenancies in common.
(3) A severance under Subsection (2)(b) does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired for value and in good
faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship in the survivor of the former spouses unless a writing declaring the
severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the property,
which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such property, as evidence of ownership.
(4) Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse
disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative
capacity, as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the divorce or annulment.
(5) Provisions revoked solely by this section are revived by the divorced individual's remarriage to the former spouse or
by a nullification of the divorce or annulment.
(6) No change of circumstances other than as described in this section and in Section 75-2-803 effects a revocation.
(7)(a) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any
other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by a divorce, annulment, or remarriage, or
for having taken any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of the governing instrument, before the payor
or other third party received written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage. A payor or other third party is
liable for a payment made or other action taken after the payor or other third party received written notice of a claimed
forfeiture or revocation under this section.

(b) Written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage under Subsection (7)(a) shall be mailed to the payer's or
other third party's main office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or served upon the
payor or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of the
divorce, annulment, or remarriage, a payor or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any
item of property held by it to or with the court havingjurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent's
estate or, if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings
relating to the decedent's estates located in the county of the decedent's residence. The court shall hold the funds or
item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement or transfer in accordance
with the determination. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the payor or other third
party from all claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

INSURANCE BENEFICIARY CHANGES, 2013 Utah Laws Ch. 264 (H.B. 65)

(8)(a) A person who purchases property from a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person for value
and without notice, or who receives from a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person a payment
or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is neither obligated under this
section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, nor is liable under this section for the amount of the payment
or the value of the item of property or benefit. But a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or other person who,
not for value, received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled under this
section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the
payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is entitled to it under this section.

(b) If this section or any part of this section is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property,
or any other benefit covered by this section, a former spouse, relative of the former spouse, or any other person who,
not for value, received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled under
this section is obligated to return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of
the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this
section or part of this section not preempted.
Effective May 14, 2013.
Approved March 28, 2013
End oi Documen"C
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for by express terms of the instruments,
attributes an intent to the donor based on an
assessment of a typical donor's intention; this
statutory attribution of intent is rebuttable by
the express terms of a governing instrument,
a court order, or a contract relating to the
division of the marital estate. Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-2-804(2).

390 P.3d307
Supreme Court of Utah.
Tyler HERTZSKE, Appel1ee,

v.
Linda SNYDER, Appellant.
~

No. 20150735

Cases that cite this headnote

I
Filed January 18, 2017

[2]

Synopsis

•;;:-- Descriptions of Judgments or Orders

Background:

Primary beneficiary and secondary
beneficiary each claimed sole entitlement to death benefits
of life insurance policy. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake Department, Su Chon, J., granted summary
judgment in favor of secondary beneficiary. Primary
beneficiary appealed.

Appeal and Error
':i.:-~

[1] presumption that primary beneficiary designation of
former spouse on life insurance policy was revoked in
divorce proceeding was not rebutted through divorce
decree's inclusion of statutory language acknowledging
that policy owner reviewed and updated beneficiaries, and

to change beneficiaries did not constitute "express terms"
enabling beneficiary designation of former spouse on the
policy to survive revocation of the designation following
divorce proceeding.

Cases that cite this headnote

(3)

Statutes
::.c'~ Questions of law or fact

Whether a statute applies is a matter of
statutory interpretation, which presents a
question of law.
Cases that cite this headnote

Affirmed.

[4]

The Supreme Court reviews a district court's
decision as to whether a statute applies de
novo, according no deference to its legal
determination.

Divorce
•.t: · • Rights and liabilities as to property in
general

Statutory provision, under which a divorce
revokes any revocable disposition of property
made by divorced individual to former spouse
in governing instruments except as provided

Appeal and Error
:::· ~ Statutory or legislative law

West Headnotes (18)

[1]

Defects, objections, and amendments

Primary beneficiary's notice of appeal met
the rule of appellate procedure requiring
appellant to designate the judgment, order, or
part thereof appealed from, and thus, Court
of Appeals had jurisdiction over appeal from
summary judgment in favor of secondary
beneficiary in action seeking death benefits
of life insurance policy; beneficiary's amended
notice of appeal stated that she appealed
from summary judgment as referenced in final
judgment. Utah R. App. P. 3(d).

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that:

[2] language in life insurance policy prescribing the method

Appeal and Error

Cases that cite this headnote

(5)

Appeal and Error
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•; .... Review for correctness or error

inclusion of the statutory language in the
decree of divorce. Utah Code Ann. §§

The Supreme Court reviews a district court's
grant of summary judgment for correctness.

30-3-S(l)(e), 75-2-804.

Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote
[6]

Insurance
';:·-- Presumptions
Statutory provision, under which a divorce
revokes any revocable disposition of property
made by divorced individual to former spouse,
creates a rebuttable presumption that a
beneficiary designation of a former spouse in
a life insurance policy, which is a governing
instrument, is revoked upon divorce; the
presumption can be rebutted by express terms
in the life insurance policy, a court order,
including a decree of divorce, or a contract
relating to the division of the marital estate
made between the divorced individuals. Utah
Code Ann.§ 75-2-804(2).

[9)

When interpreting a statute, the best indicator
oflegislative intent is the plain language of the
statutes themselves.
Cases that cite this headnote
(10)

Statutes
·.,-·· Intent

Statutes
·.··• Statutory scheme in general
In looking at the relationship between two
related statutory provisions, the Supreme
Court looks at the provisions in the context of
the entire statutory scheme.

Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

Statutes
,•... Plain La.nguage;Plain, Ordinary, or
Common Meaning

Cases that cite this headnote
(11)

The Supreme Court's efforts at statutory
interpretation attempt to give the meaning to
a statute that the legislature intended.

Statutes
,. ,. Plain La.nguage;Plain, Ordinary, or
Common Meaning
When the plain meaning of the statute can
be discerned from its language, no other
interpretive tools are needed.

Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote
[8)

Insurance
i,., .• Presumptions
Statutory provision, under which a divorce
revokes any revocable disposition of property
made by divorced individual to former
spouse, creates a rebuttable presumption that
beneficiary designations of a former spouse
on a life insurance policy are revoked in a
divorce proceeding; this revocation can be
rebutted using statutory provision, requiring
every decree of divorce to acknowledge
that the owner of life insurance policy
reviewed and updated the policy, affirmed·
the beneficiaries, and understood that the
listed beneficiaries would receive the proceeds,
in divorce proceedings only through the

(12)

Statutes
,.-- Plain La.nguage;Plain, Ordinary, or
Common Meaning
Statutes
·:.:-~ Construing together;harmony

When interpreting a statute, the Supreme
Court looks first to the plain and ordinary
meaning of its terms; but it does not interpret
statutory provisions in isolation.
Cases that cite this headnote
[13]

Statutes
•...:.·- Construing together;harmony
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The Supreme Court's statutory interpretation
requires that each part or section of a statute
be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious
whole.

[17)

A life insurance policy must contain language
specifically stating that the beneficiary
designation of a former spouse will remain in
effect despite divorce to invoke the express
terms exception for a governing instrument
in statutory provision, under which a divorce
revokes any revocable disposition of property
made by divorced individual to former spouse
except as provided for by express terms of
the governing instrument. Utah Code Ann. §

Cases that cite this headnote

[14)

Insurance
"":-· Presumptions
Presumption that primary beneficiary
designation of former spouse on life
insurance policy was revoked in divorce
proceeding was not rebutted through divorce
decree's inclusion of statutory language
acknowledging that policy owner reviewed
and updated beneficiaries, where no mention
of any life insurance policies was made in
underlying divorce proceeding, the court was
not aware of any existing life insurance
policy in divorce proceeding, and required
statutory language related to the policy was
not included in divorce decree. Utah Code
Ann.§§ 30-3-S(l)(e), 75-2-804(2).

~

Cases that cite this headnote

[15)

Insurance
~[• Effect on prior designation of beneficiary
The generic language found in almost every
life insurance policy regarding the standard
method to change a beneficiary does not
constitute "express terms" enabling the
beneficiary designation of a former spouse on
a life insurance policy to survive revocation
in a divorce proceeding. Utah Code Ann. §
75-2-804(2).
Cases that cite this headnote

[16]

Statutes
•;:-~ Superfluousness
The presumption against surplusage requires
that the Supreme Court avoid interpreting one
section of the Utah Code in a way that would
render other sections unnecessary.

Insurance
·,.-" Effect on prior designation of beneficiary

75-2-804(2).
Cases that cite this headnote

[18]

Insurance
·:.: ··- Effect on prior designation of beneficiary
Language in life insurance policy prescribing
the method to change beneficiaries did
not constitute "express terms" enabling
beneficiary designation of former spouse
on the policy to survive revocation of the
designation following divorce proceeding,
where policy did not contain any language
referring to what would happen in the case of
divorce. Utah Code Ann.§ 75-2-804(2).
Cases that cite this headnote

*309 Third District, Salt Lake Dep't, The Honorable Su
Chon,No. 140905282

Attorneys and Law Firms
Michael E. Day, Nathan Whittaker, Salt Lake City, for
appellee.
Brian S. King, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Justice Durham authored the opinion of the court, in
which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee,
Justice Himonas, and Justice Pearce joined.
Justice Durham, opinion of the Court:

Cases that cite this headnote
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INTRODUCTION
11 Linda Snyder and Tyler Hertzske each claim sole
entitlement to the death benefits of a life insurance policy
(Policy) held by decedent Edward Hertzske. There are
two issues presented in this case: (1) bow Utah Code
section 30-3-5(1)(e) should be interpreted in correlation
with Utah Code section 75-2-804; and (2) the proper
interpretation of "express terms" in section 75-2-804(2).
The district court granted summary judgment to T.
Hertzske, finding that there was "no genuine dispute as
to any material fact" and that T. Hertzske was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. In support of the
district court's conclusion, the judge held that where
section 30-3-S(l)(e) was not considered or included in
the divorce proceedings, it did not apply, and the Policy
did not contain "express terms" that would except it
from revocation under section 75-2-804(2). We affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment.

Upon receipt, it is effective as of the date you signed
the form, subject to any action we have taken before we
received it.
[1) 13 Ms. Snyder and E. Hertzske were married in March
2005 and separated at the end of 2011. In May 2013, E.
Hertzske executed his will disinheriting Ms. Snyder "to

the fullest extent permitted by law." 1 In January 2014, E.
Hertzske filed for divorce. During the divorce proceedings
neither E. Hertzske nor Ms. Snyder mentioned the Policy
in the petition or subsequent divorce proceedings, nor did
they identify or reference Utah Code section 30-3-S(l)(e).
On May 6, 2014, the court issued a divorce decree that was
silent as to the Policy and contained none of the language
required by section 30-3-S(l)(e). 2
(2) 14 E. Hertzske died at age sixty-eight, less than a
month after the divorce decree was entered. Both Ms.
Snyder and T. Hertzske declared an interest in the Policy
funds. The district court ruled in favor of T. Hertzske. Ms.
Snyder appeals the decision. 3 This court has jurisdiction
over this appeal under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)

BACKGROUND
'!}2 In August 2004, while Linda Snyder and Edward
Hertzske were engaged, E. Hertzske obtained a$ 500,000
life insurance policy from Lincoln Benefit Life Co.
(Lincoln). The Policy named Ms. Snyder as the primary
beneficiary and T. Hertzske as the secondary beneficiary.
The terms of the Policy provided a method for naming new
beneficiaries during E. Hertzske's lifetime, but were silent
as to whether the designation of a spouse as a beneficiary
would survive a divorce. The Policy instructions regarding
beneficiaries states, in relevant part,
The beneficiary will receive the death benefit when the
insured dies and we have received due proof of death.
The beneficiary is as stated in the app [lication], unless
changed.

We will pay the death benefit to the beneficiaries
according to the most recent written instructions we
have received from you.

*310 You may name new beneficiaries. We will
provide a form to be signed. You must file it with us.

G).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
(3]
(4) ,rs "Whether [a statute] applies ... is a matter
of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of
law." Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10, 16, 297 P.3d 614
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted). In this
appeal, "(w]e review the district court's decision de novo,
according no deference to its legal determination." State
v. Steinly, 2015 UT 15,117, 345 P.3d 1182.

ANALYSIS
(5] 116 T. Hertzske moved for summary judgment, and Ms.
Snyder entered a cross-motion for summary judgment,
each asserting that "his or her interest in the funds ... [is]
superior to that of the other party." Summary judgment
is appropriate "if the moving party shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." UTAH
R. CIV. P. 56(a). Neither T. Hertzske nor Ms. Snyder
disputes the material facts in this case. The only dispute
"is a matter of statutory interpretation, which presents
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a question of law." Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10, ,r
6, 297 P.3d 614. Therefore, the court properly issued a
summary judgment, which we review for correctness. See
McBroom v. Child, 2016 UT 38, ~ 18, 392 P.3d 835. We
affirm the district court's holding "that the divorce revokes
Ms. Snyder's status as a beneficiary" and that T. Hertzske
is the sole remaining beneficiary holding an interest in the
Policy.

Gj

17 We first explain the function of Utah Code section
75-2-804(2), as this statute's function is essential to a
determination of the *311 parties' arguments. We then
determine the applicability of Utah Code section 30-35(l)(e) to a beneficiary designation of a former spouse in a
life insurance policy when there is no mention of the policy
in the divorce proceedings or decree. Finally, we decide
whether a life insurance policy's procedural directive for
changing a beneficiary designation constitutes "express
terms" as used in Utah Code section 75-2-804(2). 4

I. UTAH CODE SECTION 75-2-804(2) CREATES
AREBUTTABLEPRESUMPTIONTHAT A
BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION IN A LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY IS REVOKED UPON
DIVORCE
(6) 'i18 Under section 75-2-804(2) a beneficiary
designation in a life insurance policy is revoked upon
divorce unless the "express terms" of the policy as "a
governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating
to the division of the marital estate" indicate otherwise.
UTAH CODE § 75-2-804(2). This section "revokes any
revocable ... disposition or appointment of property made
by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse
in a governing instrument" unless the "express terms
of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract
relating to the division of the marital estate" contains an
exception. Id In the definitions section, a" '[d]isposition
or appointment of property' includes ... any ... benefit
to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument."
Id § 75-2-804(1)(a). A governing instrument is "a
governing instrument executed by the divorced individual
before the divorce .... " Id § 75-2-804(l)(d). Read as a
whole, the statute creates a rebuttable presumption that
a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policya governing instrument-is revoked upon divorce. The
presumption can be rebutted by express terms in the life
insurance policy; a court order, including a decree of
divorce; or a "contract relating to the division of the

marital estate made between the divorced individuals." 5
Id § 75-2-804(2).

II. UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-S(l)(e) DOES NOT
APPLY IN THIS INSTANCE AND UTAH CODE 752-804 GOVERNS
[7] [8) ~9 This court's efforts at statutory interpretation
attempt to give the meaning to a statute that the legislature
intended. We use both the plain language of section 303-S(l)(e) and the function of section 30-3-S(l)(e) within
the context of the entire statutory scheme to determine
what the legislature intended when it enacted section 303-5(1 )(e). We conclude that section 75-2-804 creates a
rebuttable presumption that beneficiary designations of a
former spouse on a life insurance policy are revoked in a
divorce proceeding. This revocation can be rebutted using
section 30-3-S(l)(e) in divorce proceedings only through
the inclusion of the statutory language in the decree of
divorce.
[9) [10) (11) ,r10 It has been a long-held practice of the
courts in this state to "seek to give effect to the intent
of the Legislature" when interpreting statutes. State v.
Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, tjl 10 & n.14, 356 P.3d 1258. The
best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language
of the statutes themselves. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster
Plus/Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 2007 UT
42, 1 46, 164 P.3d 384 ("[W]e look first to the statute's
plain language with the primary objective of giving effect
to the legislature's intent."). In looking at the relationship
between sections 75-2-804 and 30-3-S(l)(e), we look
at the provisions in the context of the entire statutory
scheme. See LP/ Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41,111,215
P.3d 135 ("We read the plain language of the statute as
a *312 whole[ ] and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related
chapters." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Ms.
Snyder urges us to look at the legislative history of section
30-3-S(l)(e), arguing that the legislature enacted this
provision in order to "carv[e] out life insurance policies
and annuities from the revocation-by-divorce prescription
of§ 75-2-804." However, we decline to look at the
legislative history here because "[w]hen the plain meaning
of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other
interpretive tools are needed." LPI Servs., 2009 UT 41, tjl
11,215 P.3d 135.

5
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'ill 1 The notice provisions in section 30-3-5(l)(e) are clear,
and the plain meaning of the statute can be determined
from its language. A conditional departure from the
presumption of revocation in section 75-2-804 is provided
in section 30-3-5(1)(e). Where the judge is aware that
"either party owns a life insurance policy or an annuity
contract," the statute requires the judge issuing the decree
of divorce to include
an acknowledgement by the court that the owner:
(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the
list of beneficiaries;
(ii) has affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are

in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce
becomes fmal; and
(iii) understands that if no changes are made to
the policy or contract, the beneficiaries currently
listed will receive any funds paid by the insurance
company under the terms of the policy or contract.
UTAH CODE§ 30-3-S(l)(e). When implemented, this
statute reverses the presumption created in section 75-2804 that the former spouse is revoked as a beneficiary on a
life insurance policy in divorce proceedings. The statutory
language in section 30-3-5(1)(e) is thus intended to supply
the express terms of a court order fulfilling the exception in
section 75-2-804. However, this occurs under section 303-S(l)(e) only when the judge "acknowledge[s]" that the
party owning the life insurance policy has "reviewed and
updated" the policy, "affirmed" the listed beneficiaries
and the intended beneficiaries, and ''understands" that
the currently listed beneficiaries will receive the proceeds
and then includes the statutory language in the decree.
The plain language of section 30-3-5(l)(e) requires
specific actions to reverse the presumption of revocation
established in section 75-2-804.

Thus, we look at section 30-3-5(l)(e) and section 752-804 together, as part of one statutory scheme, to
"[d]etermin[e] which plausible statutory interpretation
evinces the Legislature's intent." Id We conclude that
these sections work in harmony: section 75-2-804(2)
allows for the "express terms of ... a court order" as a
means of rebuttal to its presumptive revocation; section
30-3-5(1)(e) legislates how one particular court order, the
divorce decree, can use "express terms" to reverse the
presumption created in section 75-2-804. We conclude
that section 30-3-S(l)(e) rebuts the presumption of
revocation in a life insurance policy in divorce proceedings
only when the statutory language is expressly included in
the decree of divorce.

~

[14] 1fl3 The parties in the E. Hertzske and Ms. Snyder
divorce did not take the required actions or obtain
the express terms in the decree needed to reverse the
presumption of revocation. The court below noted that
"[i]n the underlying divorce case between ... Mr. Edward
Hertzske and Ms. Snyder no mention was ever made
of any life insurance policies in the petition, findings or
decree." Where the court was not aware of any existing
life insurance policy, and the statutory language from
section 30-3-S(l)(e) was not included in the decree of
divorce, the *313 presumption that the former spouse is
revoked as a beneficiary remains. Therefore, section 75-2804 applies here, and Ms. Snyder is presumptively revoked
as a beneficiary on the Policy absent "express terms" in
the Policy indicating otherwise. See UTAH CODE§ 752-804(2).

III. BARRING ANOTHER EXCEPTION, A
LIFE INSURANCE POLICY MUST CONTAIN
"EXPRESS TERMS" REFERRING TO
DIVORCE IN ORDER FOR THE BENEFICIARY
DESIGNATION OF A FORMER SPOUSE TO
SURVIVEREVOCATIONBYUTAHCODE
[12] [13) 112 The legislative intent of section 30-3-5(1) SECTION 75-2-804(2)
(e) is further clarified when read in context with section
[15]
[16]
[17] ,I14 The generic language found in
75-2-804. "When interpreting a statute, we look first
almost every life insurance policy regarding the standard
to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. But
method to change a beneficiary does not constitute
we do not interpret statutory provisions in isolation."
"express terms" enabling the beneficiary designation
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
to survive revocation under section 75-2-804(2). It
2015 UT 25, ,r 11, 345 P.3d 648 (citation omitted). "[O]ur
is standard practice for life insurance companies to
statutory interpretation requires that each part or section
"prescribe formalities to be complied with for the change
be-construed in connection with every other part or section
of beneficiaries." UTAH CODE § 31A-22-413(2)(a).
so as to produce a harmonious whole." State v. Watkins,
This is not for the benefit of the policyholder or the
2013 UT 28, ,I 29, 309 P.3d 209 (citation omitted).
beneficiaries, but "for the protection of the insurer."
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Id Were we to adopt the notion that these formalities

~

constitute express terms in a governing instrument, section
30-3-S(l)(e) would become superfluous. There would be
no need for section 30-3-5(1)(e)'s specific method to rebut
the presumption for life insurance policies in divorce
decrees because all or nearly all policies would contain
the express terms needed to meet the exception in section
75-2-804(2). The presumption against surplusage requires
that we avoid interpreting one section of the Utah Code
in a way that would render other sections unnecessary.
See Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ,r 59, 323 P.3d 998
(Lee, J., dissenting). We therefore hold that a life insurance
policy must contain language specifically stating that
the beneficiary designation will remain in effect despite
divorce to invoke the express terms exception for a
governing instrument in section 75-2-804(2).

jurisdictions interpreting similar statutory language, 6
we interpret section 75-2-804(2) to require that the
life insurance policy, as "the governing instrument [,]
contain express terms referring to divorce, specifically
stating that the beneficiary will remain as the designated
beneficiary despite divorce" to invoke the "express terms
of a governing instrument" exception. Buchholz v. Storsve,
740 N.W.2d 107, 112 (S.D. 2007).
(181 ,116 Ms. Snyder's argument that the language
prescribing the method to change a beneficiary constitutes
"express terms" fails. The policy at issue here did not
contain any language referring to what would happen
in the case of a divorce. The express terms exception in
75-2-804(2) is, therefore, not applicable in this case.

,rt 5 This is consistent with the court of appeals decision

CONCLUSION

in Malloy v. Malloy, which used the "express terms"

~

Qj

exception to uphold the district court's summary judgment
in favor of not revoking the beneficiary designation
upon divorce. 2012 UT App 294, ,r 12, 288 P.3d 597.
The insurance manual contained a provision that "[a]
divorce does not invalidate a designation that names your
former spouse as beneficiary. You need to complete a new
[Designation of Beneficiary] to remove a former spouse."
Id. ,r 4 (alteration in original). The district court found that
the language in the governing instrument-"the insurance
policy and insurance manual, which is incorporated by
reference in the election form"-contained the necessary
express terms to effect the exception because the manual
explicitly stated that the beneficiary designation would
not be invalidated through divorce. Id ,r 5. Like other

,rt 7 Ms. Snyder has failed to rebut the presumption that
her divorce from E. Hertzske revoked his designation of
her as primary beneficiary on the Policy. Because of the
lack of express terms necessary to claim an exception
under 75-2-804(2) in either the decree of divorce or
the Policy, Ms. Snyder's *314 designation as primary
beneficiary of the Policy was revoked upon divorce. We
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to
Appellee Tyler Hertzske.

All Citations
390 P.3d 307,830 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2017 UT 4

Footnotes
Ms. Snyder argues that it was E. Hertzske's intention to leave her as the beneficiary on the Policy. However, she offers
1
no support for this other than her self-serving statements. E. Hertzske's will seems to directly contradict this claim.
Regardless, E. Hertzske's intention does not need to be established by evidentiary findings. Statutory language prescribes
how a donor's intentions are interpreted.
"[Section] 75-2-804(2) attributes an intent to the donor based on an assessment of a typical donor's intention •... [Tihis
statutory attribution of intent is rebuttable .... 'by the express terms of a governing instrument ..., a court order, or a
contract relating to the division of the marital estate.'"
Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, 343 F.3d 1311, 1318 (10th Cir. 2003).
See infra ,J 9.
2
T. Hertzske argues that this court cannot assert jurisdiction over this appeal because Ms. Snyder's notice of appeal "does
3
not specifically identify the order sought to be appealed" as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(d). However,
the requirements of rule 3(d) allow an appellant to designate "the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from"
provided the appellant is filing an appeal from a final order or judgment. UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a), (d) (emphasis added). Ms.
Snyder filed an amended notice of appeal on August 28, 2015, stating that she "appeals from the Summary Judgment
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4

5

6

entered on May 3, 2015" as referenced in the '1inal judgment disposing of the case ... on August 5, 2015." As Ms. Snyder
referenced the specific part of the final judgment that she is appealing, she has met the burden required by the Rules of
Appellate Procedure and this court asserts jurisdiction over this appeal.
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of
the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce
or annulment of a marriage .•. revokes any revocable ... disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced
individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument. ...
UTAH CODE§ 75-2-804(2) (emphasis added).
As there is no indication in the record that "a contract related to the division of the marital estate between the divorced
individuals" exists, we do not address this exception in this opinion. UTAH CODE § 75-2-804(2).
See In re Estate of Lamparella, 210 Ariz. 246, 109 P.3d 959, 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Buchholz v. Storsve, 740 N.W.2d
107, 112 (S.D. 2007); Mearns v. Scharbach, 103 Wash.App. 498, 12 P.3d 1048, 1053 (2000).

End of Document
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:Provident Life and Accident Insu.rance Company
P. 0. Box 749045 Dallas~ TX 75374.-9045
.Phone. 800-87 4- 7496 Fax 803-333-7833

May OS, 2010

KEITII WIRTZ
5175 S 935 E
SALT LAKE CITY tJT 84117

Insured Name: KEITH T V{IR.TZ
Policy Number: U900l 795
Correspondence Number: 10788583

Dear KEIIB WIRTZ:
Thank you for coniacting Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company.
Enclosed is a Memorandum of Insurance for the above referenced policy. The Melnorandum of
Insurance contains the pertinent inf01mation from your policy.

If you liaveany questions, please call the Client Setvice Center at 8-00-874-7496, Monday through

Friday from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM Central Standmtl Time.

Sincerely~
Client Services
Enclosure(s)~ Memorandum Of Insurance
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Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company
MEMORAJiDUM OF INSURA-~CE
as of May os,-2010
This Memorandum of Insurance contains the pertinent information for your policy.
This Memorandum is issued to confiim 1he issuance of th~ policy referenced below md does not in imy
way change or modify the tenns·of the Policy or amend tbe ·Policy. Details of policy benefits will be
provided on :request.
:pQLICY.NUMBER:

U9001795

ISStJE DATE:

01/01/1990

PLA."N OF INSURANCE:
OWNER;

TERM lNSURANCE
KEJTHWlRTZ

1NSURED(S):

KEITH T WIRTZ

·BASE AMOUNT:

$75,000.00

PAY1Vffi1'1T FREQUENCY:

MONTHLY

PAYMENT AMOUNT:

$87.75

RIDERINFORMA.TION:
Rider Description
NONE

Benefit A.mota-nt

CUSTOMER SERVICE CENTER
800-874-7496
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\U RTl.KEITH T

~~63 PLANADA WAV

·

NEW APP
ISSUED
HOLOlNG RELEASE FOR

PREM LOCATION: UT-S4118
Ol~tNSUREDiOWNER!

ENTERED

WIRTZ.KE ITH T

SE~: N BIRTH: 12/12/1949
OCC CLASS: REG UNKNOWN

12/05/89 TRAN 01 BY EDS

LAST ACT. lZ/0~/89 TRAN 01 ~y EDS

sn;re: ur

APP NO

3

APP STATE UT

ALTVAN

-PAYEE ELECTtON OPTION: 0
TA Xf NG ST~ TE: UT

WIRTZ WIFEtDAWNEEN

OZ DAYS

*ERRORS

TAi CD: l-000000000-HtTH i

05=BENEF:

00229
18~30

UNDERWRITER
EDS
ADMIN EMPLOYEE eos
-GUAR ISSUE

KEARNStUT 84118

~

EDS

12/05/89

BRANCH/AGENCY
AGENT

~

TAX IO; t-000000000 WllH 0

PART l

09/29/89

PART Z

RECElVEO

Qq/29/89
ll/Z0/89

LIABILITY
POL ANNlV
ISSUED

01/01/90
01/01/90
lZ/05/89

NOT COVERED
NEVER Ml?C

COVERAGE OE SCRIPT ION---------:r AX :uNo:oPTs:c:---AHOUNT-PERSON--•-AG~---ANNUAL
:eASE:CAT:NOEG:C:
TRU RTG PREMIUM
010 boo bl LIFE OPTION
001 0000 l
75.000 [NSURED 40 40
234.00
TOTAL ANNUAL ·PREHIUH

--H

234-00

RULc-P OL FE·E-------ANN---------s .A .-----QTL v---------HO-. ____ .;..__ sPec----

06

+.00-1

Z3t.OO

117.00

58.50

MOOE PREMIUM

MODE Ol
FORM DZ
BILL 10-2
EMPLOYEE NAME: WIRTZ,KEtTH T
EMPLOYEE NU~BER \9281
GROUP UD 1 78

19.50

19.50
ACC"TG

19.50

.oo

BALANCE

FREQUENCY 4 -MODAL

COMM CTL---AGENf--------LVL-t.ll.JM8ER-S--lST YR-RN-P-S-CAUT
1 100.oot MCMULLIN ASSOC 01 18~30 1 25.00% DS
Y
UNITED UNOERWR 05 oozzg O 1s.oo, OT
UNITED UNOE~WR· 10 Y2451 0 oo.ooi ZZ
UNITED UijOERWR 15 00900 0 oo.oo~ zz
MARKET:

SSA-V

----------•-•-,-.....- -..........,. .......... _ ........~ ..........~-AUDIT MESS AGES-----------~-----.....--~ .....----~ ....,...,.--,..~~---.....
KlSC
l
6l0 POLICY IS COO {WARNING)

**

SEVEN-PAV PREH[UH INFORMATION

EF-FECTIVE OATE

MEC

HEC

tALC

·7-PAV

MONTH DAV YEAR
ISSUE

IND

RS~

CODE

1

1

NET PREMIUN
so.,oo

0

••

C.ASH
,SURR VALUE

s.o.oo

~
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a):07:07

tZ/07/89
BR4NCH/AGENCY
AGENT

e:os

-

002Z9
18430

UN0ERWR ITER

EDS

WTRTl.k.cTTH T
5463 PlAN40A WAV

AO~I N EMPLOYEE EDS

KEARNS.UT 84ll.Et

-GUAR. ISSUE

.NE\f APP

ISSUEOANO RELEASED
•ERRORS
12/05/89 TRAN 01 BY EDS
ENTEREO

PREM LOCATION: UT-84118
Ot=tNSURED.~WNfq:

LAST ACT. 12/0S/89 TitAN 72 BV EDS

WTRTZ,KErTH T
TAX IO:. I-000000000 WITH 2

SEX: H
OAVEF.

APP NO

UNKN0"fN

AlTVAN

ELECTION OPflON: 0

3

APP STATE UT
PART l
09/29/89
PART 2
oq/zq/8~
RECEIVEO
11/20/89

$TA TE: UT

AIRTH: 12/12/1949

DCC CLASS: REG

({j

TAX[NG STATE: UT

05=E\ENfF:
WlRTZ l,fJFE.OAWNEErJ G
TAX ID: I-000000000 Wt TH 0

LIABILITY

01/0.1/90

POL ANN1Y
ISSUeO

01/01/90
12/05/89

~OT COVER~O

NEVER HEC

coveRAGE
noo

010

~FSCRIPTION-~---------:TAX :UNO:OPTs:c:----AMOUNT-PERSON----AGE----ANNUAL
:~ASE~CAt:NoEG!C:
TkU RTG P~EMIUM
01 l1FE OPTION
001 0000 l
75,000 INSURED ,o 40
234.00

TOTAL ,ANNUAL PREMIUM
--~ RULF-POL FfE------ANN-----------s.~.-------OTLY--------Mo-------SPEC--06
+.00-1
234.00
117.00
58.50
19.50
19.50

NOOE PREMIUA

~OOE 01
~ORM 02
~Ill 10-2
Et.\PLOYEE r-.JAr-lE: \HR TZ..KE I TH T
EMPLOVFE NU~BER 1qza1
~~OUP U0179
FREQUENCY 4 -~OOAL

ACCTG BALANCE

19.50·

.oo

CO~H C fl..;;.---:-~·~ENT--------LVL-NUHBER-S-lST VR-RN-P-S-CAUT

l LOO.OOt MC~ULL{N ASSOC
UNTTEO UNOERWR
Ui\UTEO UNOERWR
UNITF0 UN0ERWR
MARKET:

01
05

18~30 l
·oo2Z9 0

10

:v21t5l O

2s.oot OS
15.00, OT
oo.oot zz

15

00900 0

00~00~ ZZ

SSA.V

~--------.;.;-AUD I T 1-4 ESSA GE
610 POLICY .IS coo (WARNING)

- - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ ""!' _ _ _ ..;.. _ _

,use

l

•*
EFFFCTt VE .fl ATE
MONTH t)AY VfAR

MEC

I SSlJ':

l

r~o

V

s--------------..; ____________. ,.

SEVEN-PAV PREMIUM INFORMATION

~SN

CALC
CODE

l

O

MEC

**

7-PAY

CASH

7-PAY PflEM

NF.T PREMIUM

SUR.R VALUE

NET ,COST
lQ.00

J0.00

so.oo
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L tFE

POLICY DATA SHEET

TC
02

COMPANY

LIFE

ACCT# POLICY#

uo 178

09001795

REC.DATE

POUCY DATE
01/01/90

11120/eq

lNSU~EO

AGE/S

WlfHZ,KEITH T

'tO

PAV0R/OMNER
WJRTZ,KEITH T

T/UW

DOB

Q/NQ

DD
· Ol

STATUS
ISSUED

EDS

lZ/lZ/49

K

NQ

uw

95

f/8US

ssr.v

MOOE

MTH

MAILING ADDRESS
WIRTZ,KEITH T

5463 PLANAOA WAY KEARNS,UT 84118

======:===:=========================-=======================================
PLAN
AMOUNT
FLAT TEMPORARY EXTRAS
tlFE OPT $15,000.00

UNITS

RIDERS

DECLARED INTEREST RATE

o.ooo~

CASH WITH APP

io.oo

MATURITY DATE
D1/01/ZO

MODE PREHIUH
U9.50

ADDITIONAL INSUREDS

BENEFICIARY

OAWNEEN GWIRTZ WIFE

REVOCABLE

GENERAL ~GENCY NAME
UNITED UNDERWRITERS

AGENC'f CODE
YZ45l

GENEIUL AGENT

CODE

UNITED UNOERWRtTF.RS

002?<1

SOL AGENT
MCMULLIN ASSOCtATES

CODE
18430

o.P.P.

tONlROLLED BUSINESS NO
POLICY FORMS
STATE OF CONTRACT IS UT
~OS
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UN :r..n~r.i Ut.mi::F~l.<,iH I TE:]?S
P , fJ ." BOX. ::~4~:!9
!::~ALT LAKE cn•"r'-: UT ti•H 1()

F'HONE SC· 1-531-·67·;,:;

D(-\TE l.O/:l9/8'i'

Af-F'l.ICANT i.lATI:;~ Of BIFffH

~

12/:l2..✓ ~9

LFEl1F·T-COloJ

·MODE OF PAYMENT •" • 1 . • , ~

..

CHECK·..·D-MATIC

CASf-1 l,.JITH AP?l.tCAl'!ON • ~ • t

~oo

AGENT Nie,ME .. • .. •. ~ •, .... •,. •... Mc:Mu L l i

n

AGENT SOCIAL SECtmITY

~

•

4i)
~~

Assoc: i ates

1370374175

AGENl STATE CODE ••••••i'• UT

FOR ASSlSl'ANC~ (}N. THIS l~ASE PL.E:ASE CALL TEAM 4 AT 001.-532-6770"

~

~

Wirt')('\...... ,......
-~-~Llr_ I
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Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company
P.O. Box 9021 Coppell, TX 75019-9021
Phone 800-262-7338 Fax 803-333-4691
V1Sit us at www.insurance-servicing.com

August 14, 2013

KEITHWIR.TZ
5463 PLANADA WAY
KEARNS UT 84118

Insured Name: KEITH T WIR.1Z
Policy Nwnber: U9001795
Correspondence Number: 09989198

Dear Keith Wn1z :
Thank you for contacting Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company.
Please accept this letter as confirmation our records show that Keith Wirtz was indicated as
policyowner and insured at inception of 1his policy and we have amended our records to reflect
1his.

We do appreciate having you as a customer and apologize for any inconvenience this may have

caused.

If you have any questions, please call the Client Service Center at 800-262-7338, Monday through
Friday from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM Central Standard Time.
Sincerely,
Client Services
cc:

DAWNEENWIR.TZ

WiroQeJMJBS
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•

PROVIDENT

LIFE &ACCIDENT
l'NSURANCE COMrANY

•
•

l FOUNTAlN SQUARE
CHATTANOOGA, TN 37402
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C&RTIPICAT& t>SFfNIT,ONB
Age means Iha a ~ 199 cf lhtlnslfJ'&d • af hfa fut~~.0e:dlflcate meen, a~ il\dt,Rdua\ oartf&,ata t>t ms~ lStUttl "1zL On\~ w\bit Owner., 1'ho Oorliiio;slo
,ettfaHh a eumaaa,y r,f tbt bswfili of Iha e.oi:., Polby for •b ~~
·
Cln1flo1la AMtversary Mhnl thf Mmral inniveeamy of1he Car1Jffoale ~~
..
. •
Dato of
wit ba usetf for tht pUtpOse cd Uls lhOCln~ty liml Sutdda lWvhlioits u
Gmllp Po&oy and far no other i,urpaaa, •
_

la.ue

cJe&orn.irn1he .

l!mpJayea M$an$S.rrJ empfayea who fa a ~ulat.iuB4Jma &mplayea of a, anproyer, 'lb$ f!rnl)t~es and/or
fha J;mp~'$ spoute ii a member af iha .ofm a, D1uses eiglbaa f o r ~ Urtclei1h$ GmUp Polioy.
Smpfo,t1r maana any ~ e,mtoyer PBf.1JQJi>attt Who maGtt ma P0Ifoyll0ftfur aod out. requlremGnt, far
parficlpafon wtda1 flt, pf111 Q t ~ fJtCMded by the Grot4' Poley.
Face Amount lhl amwnl of fnsa,enr,e provided b'/ 1N$ OertiRtatt.
P.lrat Prtmn1m is u,e- tatal lntttat monWy
es ~ncwmJn th, GJtttif,cat&.
lnaurtd means art l!mpfoyaa m,dlor '9tb Emptoy&o'o Spouati a ~~ad to- an, Apitffcatiott, 'Wb.c· htiS buen
apprcvoc:t ror lnwrsnco bl uo.
-Owner &hilfl be the Inaurad undw tl11s CarllScatn tmlata fthM,oed a\ a latw dllta..
·Heme omca, 0~ u,, We meant Pl®'dsnt Wt .nd ACCidant lns111atDl'.I 0am.P8n1. i ~ Stu~
OhPttanac,ga, Tenneun 8740!, M'I ~ to nbe'\ "him"· cr«lhit'., Will mo JTtfm' to "$11$" e>r 11htsr'.

r,

r-atum.

"tbsy", •thraffr' or~;-.
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PROVID&NT L~s AND ACQJDEN? INSURANOE COMPANV.
1 FOUNTAIN 8QUARS. OHA'TTANOOGA. 'tt'l 61402
(A Stc'Jek. Com~)
GROUP OE~ilF1CATE

l11sunu.t1

AtaG • Oertlftcate. flf.ttn

Certlffo.nt NUmber:
Srn1?.Joy,,r .Pardobnmr:
PoJ:fcvhtdrl•r: •
• ~•

OB?ilfI~ 0.11S1:

Date of-188U•;

...
0SR11FIQAT5 13iff5FITS

}':ftt ~Rmllbf'O! -$

eubaeq11mtt PmntJUma; Payabft MRrtthf)' as t>esorlbed acstow,
w, tnw~·1asuad and eanv-,ed a carou~ Tenn Life lraJtMca PoReytc, tho PdicyJialtiaf p; .e~ aim.. Thf,;,
Cdoatt 11 net a oonlraat. It fB an. aufllna of ihtl ~ e of the $'Qtlp T11m tJta tn,ur.r¥l& PU1.l\ ai
l ~ • tfflN[dld U1"ldeY ,h,, Group Pd:y. Tne aroi:p PolloYi• lh• connct. In Ile want er any quaancn,
Uta tcme of~ Qroup Pc1tGY govern. ihlii Oer1mcats 1s gQ\18~ by th1 laws ~t fmi Stat& of Rhmle. faflncf

wtmr& the Group Pc!loy hu bsei1 dsltverddt
•
The Jmned !t ccvnd \lnd8J' tha Gtoup Polloyforlhe J'&msAmaum 8flm¥n abtMt. OMraga ii llfelitive an
ih• 1-r oh (1) the Oerfiffcate Oatbl 1Jr (a) tht "- 'Qf te~e.ipt at our Homa OfflOI of th• Ptlat ?ramh.rrn due
'for lht9 Der'liflcete.
~ First Premium la d1111 an tht Cf)dfJoate Oats. Stlbstqua.nt. pl.'lffliilma aJwff bacort\f1·dua on tiaab ffiC!t\th~
mnmtear, at ita 0.ritfio&ID Date end ohe,t;a Iii smount With a Cllislnaa fn tha "'8ured1$ amened ca;e.. ~
ijddfUon. we Ghd hmta Uta t1aht to olmnp ht premhJrn. mte.a en any monlhb' ,nntvarn,y of Iha Oertmaste
.Dmet. bcwever-. WI wtU not maka t~ unqa mo~~ thmi ono»15Ul1n9 any penad ot ~ IXh'1BBwdVe

morwhl,

Whin v,e reoawe proof of 1b6 dGaU\ of tt\a tn.eu~ v,e w1fl pay_ \h9 Be•h11y2l1Y oaata sanetnt ~le,

The Dllfh .a,natJt- la e~t to 1he Fact Amount· of 11".sunutcs ahown above Issa r.tny due and unpaid
pramluma for tWa Oertlflimte, M ,my tintG prior 1e> Iha dutb ot th• meurecft tba ~ «1aV cmmge 11\a

~ t a e-o~, hrt rruoh ohqa mutt bot t1l tnacte in wrfllngi (e) alanad by 1M Owner s.1d S11Y
trrswoablt Beneficktryj and (8) ffled at otir Hom• Offlot°'3'Jet1Qa wi\\ ffll& Upt>n the atllflat ot: (1) tarmlnelion Of empl~twfth 1he El'optoyer..(~ tmm1natf6n Of
membsrahip 1n 1.ha qlffsM tft;lblD for lm1umnos under me Elroup ·PoUQYi ta, tha lni~d•1r 70\h btdhd:sri or
(4) obr aonditiOna aouUrned In the.Glaap Palley~ .Attucl\ Umi tl1 mttm,d • aunvan'\hfa 'C0'11MDIJI to
,an lndl\lldual poffoy of lff• lntUtenar. (1) within 81 days affertem1fna11'on; (2) wlth.ovt ovtdenr;a Of loeurabi(ity;
arid CS) ~ ~ thD aondlUota ~fcrtb mltl9 GroliP f'o!oy.
(rj

/:L_.~L'-tf.~
~~ffi:J:lA PAMC11i .
SeoretarY

•
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··PROVIDENT
LIFE.AND ACCIDENT
lflfSUR.AN<:ti eoMPANY
(lf-lA'TTANOOGA TN S7-40R
{A S1001{ COMPANY)

.

G RO UP

I N S U A A N C g: P O J. .f O Y

.... ·

Wa \!QllHJ t1., {)ay lht• Oealb l:faner11 oi thta .f'oft'y occ.ocdmg 1\l llt prov1s1on$ Ytllf• 1ospar1 to ~'1 lnsutei(f s. as
tlohriort 11nrr;-m Tbn E'-'"IPlc»yer
trual nanHili al)cJVn

r, obl19blecl to cunt,Jl1utu to 1he lund 1or 1hn l•ll,m,:d" t.'ltthfJ!lhod \JlltfOt lhs

Thul Pt)JJc 'I 1 Js"nort bs<sod M the ll()pln:JJlltJn c,J Joo Pol1(~Yltr>fdGJ f!Od -thrr Pil\f&Ttff(il l 1· 111 \.••tltUnW ne PJOVW~<J
harbh1 U wtlr tnk~ aff ai;:t on thB PoUcy D.nln us sttoym nbGve. nue PQhr,y iihnfi bB r.-~1v;fritr-r1I 111 at:curdanao
w1lll fhEt f,l\'1!7 (1I llu, Sisto 01 Rhod~ loland wliuro ti 11; drslJ11(1rad,
All ll'm (ml~1sitlnt on ·1h1s nnd lM follow<ng pag&}l a,a· 1iatl of th\e {)otrw ►
1

~

4~~

~J ..:.. .r~ CJ Cv J£._;

CHAISfOPHEA A PAf:1ROTi

WINSTON W WAL~Ell

Sa<.1oh)1Y

.P• r,~1tJun1

GROUP TFRM Liff: INSURANCE· •
NON~Af\1\011>A'\'IN(a tNO ANNUAL OlVlOt;NDSt
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CERTIFICATE EFFECTIVS OATE' • •.•

OONVEASIOf.J'
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.

D1:A'TH BENEFIT PROVISION ...
- ... ....
0EflNITlON8 I•

ELlGlStLITY

..

......

..

aeNERAt. PROVISIONS •••

I

.,

..

I

.

4

. ...
• • • •

7
I • •

• '•

~

......

..

TERMINATION OF POLICY •.• > •

4

!l
.•

GRAC!: PERIOD l
' ........
OPTIONAL MODES OF. seTTU;MENT
PR~MIUM PAYMENT
if:J:lMINATION OF INOIVIDUAlr lNSUMNC~
I

..... -.

••

,#

I
J

..

...
...

. .....
#

"

... ..

4

5

4

~

8
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POLICY DATA SHEET

re

COMPANY

ACCT~ POLI CYtl-

REC.OATE

02

LIFE'

U0 178 U900 1 795

11 /20/89

INSUQ.EO
WIRTl,KEITH T

U'rl

ST A TUS

EDS

IS SUED

DOB

AGE/S
40

H

T/U.W
95

12/l2/49

T/BUS
SSAV

----------------------------------------·---------------------------------PAYOR/OWNER
0/NO DO HOOE
WIRTZ, KEITH T

•

POLICY DATE
01/01/90

NQ

01

HTH

1'1ATLING ADDRESS
WIRTZ,KEITH T

5463 PLANAOA WAY KEARNS,UT 84118
PLAN

RA TING

AMOUNT

FLAT

TEMPORARY EXTRAS

LIFE OPT P5,000.oo·

•

UNI TS

RIDERS

DECLARED INTEREST RATE

•
•

o.ooox

CASH WITH APP

so.co

HA TUR ITY DATE
01/0 l/20

BENEFfCIARY
_
DAWNEEN GWIRTZ YIFE

•

Sl9.50

ADDITIONAL INSUREDS
REVOCABLE

GENERAL AGENCY NAME
UNITED UNOERHRTTERS
GENERAL AGENT
UNlTEO UNDERWRTTF.RS

CODE

SOL AGENT
HCHULL IN ASSOCTATES

CODE

CONTROLLED BUS[NESS NO
POU CY FOR.MS
STA TE OF CONTRACT

•

HOOE PREMIUM

AGENCY CODE
Y245t

00229

18430

rs UT

EDS

• ••• - _ _ ...,1,-
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Dl3PINJ'fJONS
Age rnoons \ha ntt&Jnao age oflho ln~red os of his loel birthday,
Applloolfort t$ the uppt1oa1100 completed by 1hr, Insured.
~rtU\oato means ;in. lfld\vtduu\ oontlica\e 01 1t1suranta, ·fo~uad lot d~bva,y to Jho Ownat Thtt- Cartihr.otf>
~ttla ft1rth a eummory ot the eS$enllel fa~h,fes or this Polfcy ru, eaGh (r,sured
.Cartlftcato Annlver.s11ry m~ans tha annu~I annrv,naary of 1ha Ostt1f1aa10
Oal<4..
.
O'ato ·ot Issue wm b& lJ&ed lot the purpo~u CII th(I lnoon1as1ab1hty and 8vtctda prov1sumJ? and fnr n() oUnu
purpc,sc, ihn Doto ttf l$sue 1a ~hown in lhtt Orntlllcole.
Smployeo .moans anv omr,ravee who Is a renular fun-1,nn, 11rnplay(lq nr an f:mptuyar Tha FmptuyE\(\ nw1 u,
lh~ l:mployeo', 9pouse 1st n'lnmha, of thtt closs or tlaos()li r>bgtbla fr,, sosuri"lnta. tJnder lht~ Pnllr,.
Employer maons any eltgtbfa umJJ(uyer {1Drtto1ptint wr.o:
t1) moats \h\\ PolttYholdat and lM roq\Jlron·umls fa, J)nrt,c,1,inli<>rt -,,11doi lhs pfun of rns~rtmr.1, pr1Nult11t
by this Pptlny; ~nd,
,2, ha!> ou1Jm111a~ tm ~PA which haa oaan approved by \IZI

.

E!mpfQyer )';lnr\lclpnnt AppJlontl¢n, taoro111 reforrod •~ 01r llU• FPA 1c; Iha pppl1c:al1011 curu1,1~,t\d i1y u1c.

Emt1loyer.
Face Atnoul'lt 1s 1h~ omuun, or tn!iUrance sho\~il 1n aath Gert111ca~H.

f'(rol Premium is lho folol inflt:.11 mc,nthly premium DO ~hcwm·1111ho (.11)rhflt.SIS
H01he Office, Our, Us, Wo muo11: Prov,dEn'JI lJta Rnd Arr,dC1nt ln~wwira Company, 1 Fl>unta,n t,tlll ,m
11

Ghi\1\l:lt\OU\)11, TennbS®tl ai-4\l~ Any tC!QH!nt6 \l) 11 \1\:) a 'hn\l

t)I :

h1~· -.'ir\\ rdst)

rll(or ti)' Jiht, \lr • hra.'

'Umy1 "them" or "lhijll~
lo.curod moons .on Enttlfnyr.11 ttud C\t tin ~t:mployt1a1s Spo1J!lf\ ,,!i 11c1inm.J 111 '1n AppltQalcou, wits· hr1:.: l>Mm
apprbvod for fnnumnna hy tlrt
•
Owner 11tion bG lha lnsuuu I uo-:101 Iha Uertmcal6' 1.h'IJass ct1n 11uo11 Ol a ltnor date.

Polloy Dtlto 1s tho daltJ hum \lrftrrti r,nboy yon,,;, monlfH~ onrJ 1,n1ovnt.ssr1!'s. wlll bn lfstormmnd
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ELJQISILITY

ench propas~d tnsu1ou buc;o1no, o\1Qll)\b tor ln~urantm undr:r thl& Poncy on the later ot:
(1} tha dale the Stoup 1erm Lite f)lan of 1nsuranoa la efroctcve under u,c, SPA; or

r,rov1dep
.
.
[f ~m:h ruar,o~d lnsuted ta nQl than In an altgtble olasi, h(i Pboomss ebg1ble (or ln$utonoa 1J11dQ1 1hrs Pohe;y
M Iha dare )\e, anlEUJi M allglble olast{.
[2) the dat& th& r.i1oposi.d IOSl.lted aompfates ifla cngfbllfl~ period es specified In such E~A.

such lnsvred ls lhun 1n M aflglble o1a9~, •

l.Jnle$;:1 olhel"tYlse rustt·1c1ad on lhil EPA. llllf enalble class
shoV rncJuda tiU lnsLJteds •

nf lha Emplr.yer ror lneurantto ondor 1h111 Pohtfy

...-OJaRTIFl'CATB fiP-P130ilVE PATB

Gj

ThQ l~~ur~d ts f:OYMIJd 1.11Klot th•R Pa1,~v for lhr> Fnca AmCJunl ahnwn In tho Oerllficn\~. Cova,~1-w 1!, ltlf1;rct1\'a
~n \ho lalet ol: (11 tha f,m1lflc1\1a Date: or l2) nu; dnta QI 1rum1p1 at nur Hott\$ OJRc:tt ~f tt\o rllrt ,Prurmum
doe for 1he Certlffoata

lHLA ,. H "8

e Ni

I T P RO VI S J O N
Up01, r~cij1p\ al duo ptuo\ inat \h& t1ua1h ol un lnsu,od nntt,oed whff£J his 0$rtlllee1~ wi.~ ln Jowcf wr w1ll J>ily
to Iha beneflels,y a O~lh a~nr.ir,t ·rho Dea\h Banoflt ts Qqual tu IlJ minus (2J, whe~e;
(1) 1s tho Ftae AtnamU iii lmuiranoQ on tho Insured as 11hnwn m lho lnscJred~~ Oarnbt"lllo uuu •
(l!} ,~ a11y duo and unrmtd arElntruma rot lho oertlllcatn

•

~

PR~MIUM PAYMENT

Ari prGmlums aro ptwnfllt 111 ntNnnctJ al our l-:lt1tne OfflaG

The pramtum due. lat t1ai,1, C,<11\lh~altJ wlll b(s tE\lc.ula\ed sop~\t\\C,11 l hR ptumusm clut\ und,u th,, f ·1Js11 't ~\~ell
ha lhti aum or thh prsmmrn~ dutt JtJr all Oartittcates In fomn wOh lllff F-mntoyar8 DI'\ suoti prerni111·, t.Jcm ,1a10
Tho FJrsl Ptomlu1tt Im ff CU.rhflriltll 10 due on )to Oernf100\n Del~. Suh!lnquent prt\lT11L11na .shJII bcw tm1e <lua
on oaoh monthly nn1w,c11tmry QI tho CnrtiUcola ·o,nn and chongo rn. emnunl with a chang~ 111 .tha r,u.uh,ct's
allaln6d 8(1&.
II\ oddfllQn, we shalf 1,1wo thn noht to ohanga tlla. premium tatss (Qr lh~ Cltoup 1erto Lila lnsurifflt.l\ nny
motJlhty ~nnwe,sary of lho~anflloa\e Dato: however wa v11ll not make t11,s channo mhtll nr,1111 thnu noce
aunny nny potJotJ of \VMJv(J tonnocutlvt months

on

0 R A O 6 ·p f: IH 0, D
If. th~ p,atr11\JM du-~ lor th!\ Garnbcure le not [)EUd on the prenuurn due dOtP, ll Grate P~mid nl 31 1lu~t- lm11r
that dntB w~I bn nllow(ld 111
fht,- ptetm1vn,. TI1G Cnttif1talo wan um1Brn m f9•~'1l dutuiu Um -c 1t1Jt.1J r,mmd

,,~y

lho Gtbc-8:Per,od tS 1101 gumtndJor thn Flrsl Prorn1um
fl lhe fnsured d:GB dm1t>() U1e OtllDO Ponod. we wlll daduci any due itnd urtp~id prem1umq 110n, u,,. flJU~·ue.d~
<1I Iha CartI(fcale

i)

Wi~fflJ
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G6N6RAL PROVl$10NS

lin1lro Corttrnct. The anu,e oontl'llct cqnslsls of!
{1} ln1s PoUcy end nny ~uppleirion(al bonoDl pr()vlst0iis nUiJc:had
(t?) thfl appllCBltOO rar lhlS Pohc.y, a <rOPY.,Ol which IS ,a1tuthHd
(~> Iha ~P>\'9: ancc
:14-) an Gorunca1es issued under 1h1$ Pol,c~. 1nnludmg lho AppllCill1ons for suoh c~rullaates. Nn statttmenf will bo usotl to vold thfs Policy, or 6ny C1ut111C.Aftt issued undo, fl tml~iE& aueh sunemenr ,~
ro1\tar11Qd 1n ·(l· Wdttf)O Appf1cohon, No slatoment wdl bs\ usncf 10 def ont.J fl t:l~1tr1 · unJess 8UCh statem&nl ,s
c-ontamtJd rn a Yltrt11)n Appflca(loh· All statomoole win. 111 tllL nl,s.Pnro or (rnud 1 bo &Jomod r&pre$t1nlal1Qn5
af\d no1 wa«onue~.
'ModlflcaUon of Oontca~t. Etatipt ns ~roVlcJ8tt t<l lba Ccunplm1me W1&h law prnvlR1M, no om~ rnra r.hbngtl
i!nV part Qf U11$ Polu.•-y u,rcept 1he f;Joff~yhold&r nod ona oJ caur ufltl'~J'i 11J111Uy. No on& o.en ch&ntJe al\\. (lilt I of
.iny Certtf1ca1e 1so11ed unrtar this P61rtY, Olec;epl U,e OW1uu and om• ur tuJt omoets Joinlly, Any r:hang&s must
Ile Ill wrnrr1u ~nd s1gt1ad by both par)iae. Howevp.t, p1am1Ult1 rilllt4 l'flety b8 c.honged accmdtng In lho
P11~1111i.Jr1' Paymqni pto'1tSion ()t Ihle Pblltiy.
.
~
\nQCH'ltee\nbHJty, "Tht'l. Pnlicy shall ~ lru:,mtq1HabJa lrum 1111 ruin}' DClto. No s1atomen1 maua. l)y tho
Insured ro1itl1~0 to his u;s1mmc.n shoU ba u~ed ln cMM·• 1,1~. ( uillhcnll' l~uad on the bas1rr ~r !iurJi
!ll8it1mont oflor II ha~ bfffln m fort.er durmQ lt\8 Insumd'!i llfi!u111v l,)t 2 yourij from fl!> Pole uf ls,uo, Md tfl 110
11vonL unl$!ill 111, .nan.1nin1;Ai 10 11 w,11tan AppJ1tntlon 11lynutl h'r l11!H ,, f)l1py 01 which la o, hn& bfjC11t Jurnruhud
·1 n t,irn or to his banel1t\U:U)'·

.

~

.

Sufolde. II wiuun 2 yeart- ltQm thff oata bf lssuo ol lhe CNH•t 1HO lllfl rmmred dJos by SIJfc:ttfn v.iuh-, !lune
t)J lneuna, U1e anwunt J>ayltbla 1n p1aoe DI an 01he1 benuf1t} ~h.ltl b11 111G num ol 1he· p,em1uri1~ f)furi wnh
rospor.t ta tl'le (;Jroup r arm Lllff lnsurMce provided unde1 hr ., ,Ntsr1r ,1tR v111hov1 v,tetn!it
Ml~ettnamant Of Aga ll lhll age ot tho lt1Wt(1d hru lu •"· r11i• Harod- any smoun1 p~llblc; llod,u hrs
CortHIOUlG Yit\l be \hn\.nn\oun\ whk:h \\'le pram1ur_n 1n1a iii ollm.t JI\ 1h11 <Jato 01 hlo doath would l!RvC.\ bqJJghl

nl thu cortool noa
Nori-PArtlcJpntlng, This PCJlr.cy ond ·Oii Certlrlcatoa ,ssuod 1111dm u tin 1\t>l part"'1p:ite t11 HM OJ mu tJlrrplu,
No di~Jdonds Q/CJ psyahlfi.

OwnQr1a FnghU1. Ounng lh'w- ln$un>d'n Ulll\l'nu,. \ha- Owttwi m h
. .
(I) aa~>go U1a Oerldinato,
(2) ohonga lf•o 8oneftr.iary undor lhB Catlfllcou~ oxcopt lm 1111\' 1mwocuUIE'I Bone!IOJP1)'i
{3) ohange tha Own&r undot 11\Q Oertmcate~ nnd
(4) exorch:l\. teLalve end enJoy ev~ty oJher 11ght1 t)onviil ,md prMftJao c;onltJlnod in \ho Cat11ftt-.aJn.

unlesa a vmttan nntle<\ wh,th f)r(IVCd~s otherwise IS mid wllh Uh Nti ,:M.1JGnt ta na~ded lrnn, nny r.nntmQffll\
uwnet or revooabls he1\ehct~uv.
.
.
Chnngo of Ow1\ar, ~o ·Qwr\tu i(111Y chong~ 1ho UYllKJUahlp ul tho Cotl(l\cale i'lhil~ lht; loetUt'd 13 allW A
ctmnoo 1ll Ownar anu!rt (Ju rruicJo rn vmth19. To bo bln<ftng. tin 11,i thts c-han~a n1us1 bo s,gnad by Jira OwrtBr
~d ·to\l!il bti Ulad a\ (IOI Hulllt~ OIJiqo. My LIUC'h chru\(J~ 9ltB11 .ltJku utroct on lho lJllfo 11. woo 61.0nfJd• .8LJbJe~,
10 cit1y puymunt CJI 01hor ttr.uun 1cdcQn by us bafoto fho r.hnm1u v1-1s hh,u

·

Page 6

m.a:a:aa_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _W
_
i~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

G E N E A A L P Et () Y I S I O N S {Cont',d)

Asalgnmonl,, The Owner may a119lgn tho OerUftQtUe Such asa1gntnen1 musl b1:1 made ul wutmu No
aas,gnmanl of flltt CerdfroQte will be btndlno an ua unlrl fl llb$ bean f1lad at our Hom~ Offrc:e and h1ymnf by.

lt) th$ Owner: and
-l2) MY irtttvocebta Bener,i;ae!Y·
Ear.h assignment wm be sub1ao1 to any pnymenhi ar attron taktm h\' us bofore It was Hlod Wp. will nflt hq
1nsponsJble for any 4S018rim9nt bGtnn \lt11td or aor~atGnt.
Tho 881'\sJicTary ol the oo,utn:ate 1s as s«s1~0 111 mA Apf'lliGRtlo_n unrao lat~r ci,ooJlld IM
a~nar1ciE11y 1s lhe p~rty· d&ifgnoted to teowvE! ;3ny benehv, iravabls al the dEU!.lh or th~ Jnsutoo Utdrir.•.
olhMwfsa p1ov1Cfed, 11 any Bonet'?fa,Y shell·
(1JMt surV1YO Jhn Insured 1hu 1ntorCl't ril ~1.Jch Benel1CJett ~-hClll \-Heat ,n tha (1YJtiet: o,
(2) dlo within 1he 24 hou, perfOd tollowlng the <Jealh oJ Use. lll1>t1ustl, dann ~UJamanJ w,H bn Jnudn lU t
such Sens001a1y hur;l <11ad bolora the Insured,
l)m· Jr~bdlly ·will bci dto~ltntgad Ir) thtJ BJUml nf an~ pa~nu~11i \ti ,1r l,nr, t~llen Pilot 10 1acetpl ut d,1,• 1,1\li'I iil
.doelh Qf eucll Sanefl0l01y.
.
Change of aenefJclotY. At any 11n1a prior to tha.cfaoth o( tho fnsutnd aha ownet rnav ~h-anglf a u,\·••nshlo
Ti11naf1clmy Atly,&uoh chM(I(! «11.1 1,t l>a rnacr~ In wtlllog lo hn httuf1ru1 ,,11 us· lho chango must h11 ,,,wf 11. t:r,r

aenoflr:fary.

~

Mt>tnG omco ond e19ned· bV:

·

l1) 1hr. OWnrn: And
{2} uny lrrpvoellbls Benehr.rary.
An'/ oueh ahanQo sh.ul tako <dlO<'l 08 nf lho dalo ll Wn!> n1gnoci :-11b1n:;1 lo iihy pt1ytr181lt c>r lllhlff •l• t,, na •~lure\,
l1y us baftu~ fh& ch1mnn Yim, f1f1111
•
.Compllonao With UJW, II noy JU()\115,lOO or lhJs Pnlic:y ,~ •11 t ~vui;~\ Wllh ilray ftl)pl1r.abte sla\111~ d ... 1t,•1t4hv
nrnandoti lo uontorr'n ttJ me tn)l\1mt1m rt1qu1tsrnF.1nts of sur n , Lltuu-1 w,1 .aoservo ·n1a r1ohl u, i'111 1,•nd- :ii~~·
prov1s1o~ nr thls Policy 1n c:omply wm, changat rn anyt

mnppffoeble steltJta:
l2J reguJauon~ nnd,Qr
(3) ruf1f1{19 lpsuod und~r 1hn p,avl;irans ol the lntarnol Ruvuriu" <:CHtr+

Ou~ proof of dea\ft ol Iha ln$urctd must \)ti submillad to our Honw Clll•1. \i.
nflymcJn\9 by us nra pllynbJ& a, ouc Homo Offlo&,

· f't1y1l1ttnt of Procaetls

An

T.&RMll'IATfON OF POLICY
Tfll~ PoJlcy ohDll tatnnnDlo With 1-ospecl io (In Elnployar (lr\l:,· ·tJu1 r•ol au to all tmpl0~a1Sr u1, mu 1u1t1rn. c,i
l1) lha dal~ 80 EmpJoy61 coases to parllclpl.'l~ In the lndu9h'( .Cil<JlJ(l fllSIJIRnC8 Tnt9li OJ
·• (2) tha oxplrolkm ol 1.ha Guic.o flonod f01 oU Oa1Urt~atur. uf di\ EmpluyurWhon insurance tenninnt()S ae doac;ril>ed In (1) 01 12) abnvo. JhJs Pohoy sheU ltuminale wltt, ,~,;pa~ l lo ull
lnsurerJo ot the p'3rllr.Ulnt Employer. Tha fmplt1vo1 shnll n111tr) 1;. 1n wur,ng whE'o partlQ1p11lmn , na!iae tt'l lhe
lndvotry Gt~up Jnsursnna irufll
.
Upon wrmlnauon t1f tins· Pt>hc.y with tocp~r,t 10 ahy u, F1il lm1i1oym•.1 shu ln!rumds .shntl 1J£J i;nhlltuJ 1c, thtt
ugllla ond bBnelUs pro'/t<lod rn thu Cc,nv~ts1on. ~m,llngn pl\•.-1~1 1m <JI Om, ~(lftey.
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TERMINATJO.N or= INOl\lJOUAL JNSURANOe
The tnsuranoe on an ftrsur1:1d \mdor lhIP Poffoy shall terminate (>fl tho moolhty aonwe,sary of the CeJ\lfttate
DalCi colm:1ding with or rte~ lollp\Yulg tha &tJrlfast ot.
P) lh~ d~ltJ Ole Emp1oyp0 iormmatas ernployma"L os def1n0d below,
u~J fhii d,lo lhe 1I,sured coo~$$ m be a ttt(urtber of ·1he class at ctessos or maured·.a hf1Q1bfo Jor ·
lt'ftU.Bf'll>O undo( thfl) Po~ny.
.
(Q) thA lnsurod'b 70lh bii1hday,

{41 the dola (hi$ Pofioy torm1flolsa wnh ~peel lo· the Jnsun,u's Employer: or
(S\ \ha dnl$ tha Employct, wllh rospcicl to 1hq fn$ured. sto.Pei 1uiw0td1no ormnllltl'ui ft,r this flleuo1n1:,,
H<>wavat, on =mpJoyeo who 1s reined, dlsnblfld, grant&d B laava ol nlla~naaJ ot 1smpo,ar,1y 1u1t1 off ,~di b»
c;oqsld~ted 06 6bll employed llnllt thb l:mployijf, act,ng on a t)n$l~ PHlC\Uc;ilr,g 11\dlVidual ssleGhon \l}Jmma\Q'J

lhe Emploifea's anouronae br
( t) nt1tUying u$ 10 th.81

cmae;,~ nr

(2) stopping premrum payuumlJ, 101

t~1s tnaumni:a.

1r \he lnsured entare lhij mU1lnry fntt:a nf ~ny C!OlJ.nll'y llt War Wl\<'lhar decl~r~d or· 1mdf;lcfEJ1ud1 he$ me:uu1ni;u
!?hell not continue Jn lorcu~ bovonti \ha dcite ho 0r1tot'J sur.h rmrf\
..;,.

CO.NVBRSlDN PFIIVJLSGE

rermrnnllon of t:n'iployman1 or litlglblUly II dll or any pntt -01 ilta, lniuiutl's 1nsuumco unt1a1 tti1= •P~hr v

due to tormloollon ot
r1) omplnyment wllh Oui hnti,lr,yllr

(:\UJGas

1Jr

(:11 me1t1~m$hlp Jn th~. i:111ssl¾~ ebl}1bro lor ms~cEJut:ili tiMcr m1!i t>((ftt'y,
tho Jnsutod shpll btl onlfl)PJcJ tu hf\\lri •~11uM to hln\ an tnd,vJcfttnl Jmlrry nl t~a ms,.nancb .11111·nuJ1/fl·1J,i\ 11t:lte:y
wJIJ ba eub]eol to tho tollowmrr
·
ClJ 1ho lnsursd flltf~l rr111k1,> wnncm oppJ1caUan to us a11~ f/lh' Um .11rsi pcrlmh1111 Wllhrn 31
1\lll-l

tarmlnallon~

w,.

(iJ

l~J 1ho pohoy wlll bo a levof prnnltOn'l,

loval bltn~s,1 psmm1wn1 i,h.,l'I of ff(t., insoni.nto 1her1 bulny ''L 1,ud
IJy us Pl lhCJ ago antJ fw Iha nmm.1n1 hpplfod for;
.(3) 11\e iioliey wlll be Jssuud w11haul avldonce t:>t fnsurbbllrty or suppJijm11ntas ~eneflt$i
1-4) Iha pol,oy \'-SIU bo \n n~, otnmmt nol sn encc.ona oU\\£\ fllnr>\mt of mturanc.ie which C:Ult~»$ l1ut.H\nm 111
lortf\inatlon, 10(111 ihr.i !}Jl\~Unl ar pny lr.surnnr.e ror whlrh IJIIC'h 1na\lr&d is or· beeomes Gf1gllll1• llt)(Jltr
the same. or any 01hnr gtoup .P\lftcY wlth1n 01 day.s Pilar [tumln11U0n.
{SJ 1ha premhJm for 1nt:1 pohey wlll \lr.s at ,n,r UU1t1 cufllom~• y nM 101 t~o form. ~ga. and .nmour•I ,,, lhR
. lndlvldUal pollcy appJ1~d fat~ and
·i6)thb ptil1c.y wnl bot;omo rlfr.ruv~ llt \hf) and 1>r thtJ ~,, dt1y J)\utocl du,1119 whrch 1110 lll!.ll.lH•d wa~
ontilled In llJ)ply:
~

Wi~
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C O N Ve A" S I O N P A I V l L e G E

(Oont1d)

1:ermJl'\Gtlon of POllQY or Olass, II all bran}' part of en lnsuied'6 1nsuroooa Orld~r this Poll~ cets(Js crue to
~tmlnl)Ue>rt of:

(n this Policy wi1h rQBP~Cl to tho Empfoyor; or
(21 the Jnciursnoo ol any tlaa, al lf\sureda by arnsndmenl t61h18 Pof1c.y,

~d tf \hat UlSUtont~ hos b~an mlor~n for at laofl s years print ln auuh tcirmma.brm d1JJ9. tho tnsu,od shhlt J>f.\
Cl'\\lllpd to hilVlflSSuad to l\11n an inrfi~ldUlll pcllr:y cf hfa losuts11oe Tho 1nd1vit1ual pof,cy w,11 brr suhjo~t 10 tl\~
~M~

.

( 1) thu looured must rnaf(a YJUU13n applrcallon tu U$ and pay Un, r1,s1 p1F.r111um wlthfn $1 tJ&y!. Pher

tcrm1no11on,

'

1~, tha J)oUcy will ba- a levol p,a,mum. rflveJ boneht, ponnannnl plan nf hfP 111~111am:e 1hn" harno Jaan11rt
fl}• t\a hl Iha ago ond fot lho ·oMouMI npJiUCid for .es indfc'3lfJd beJaw
ljJ lha poJ1c:y wllf be Issued vllthnuc flvrdon~n of lnaur1'1bJJity or supplom~nu,1 henehls~
{~I lhD prq,n1ul'P l~r \fie f)obcv will b., i:il nm 1n0n .cuttommy ram lu1 1hu lnfln oge. anrr iimm.mt-tJI 111,1
1nrJ1vr~uel poll~y a1>plied lr.,r: hl\O
·
{b) 1t10 (Xtlu;y wJll. boaume uflm:11va Iii 1ha and of tha 3.1 day per1pd d,mntj wh1oh (h~ in~utnd WM
t'lnhllad ID pppJy
.
Tha SJrMUnt of the pnbc.y tnttV nnl-o,.raE><l tho lintollar of (1) loea 1,1, ni t:.n. Ytl101a

tho ucnour\t of tho l11siur~J ~ unurnnca ooaelno bec&ono nf the tnrmu\.nliM
Pollt.y.

( t) ,~

br

nmon~mo1\t 1Jf lh~

(~J Is lha amount at 111,y JflB\Htlrt"" Int whh;h .h1;1 L-t uf J)a,;-<>rl'lfus ol101blo uniiw 11rly moup pr,l,cy 1Mm&d \II
1fJltltlutod by u& OJ any I\Umr 1111s111r1, w1lh1t1 Gi d&}'S afjr,, tm1ninot1tJ1\ 11ncl

131 Is. $1 O.DCJO.
Wouco QI Alght to Oonvori. If nu lni;ur130 buootnc,1niirgibf41 ta r.onvt,rl ,mer 1s no1 grvort ru>ll~c, w•\hiri t 1:
<foye. tho 11\~UrqtJ t;hEJD h~vo on nddUrnnal pariod,wllh11'\ Wh\nl, trs a1tarc-11Jr- $\1cl1 llghl Nolhmg tuntt.1Taett.
htl(l:llt, .ohall bo conetn,od to c-anhJIUl'J any lfl!lllfllOOQ bayand the PPtU'>tf flm\llilnri rn lhr., P<1lf~v lhn nrll!1h01tal
ri<1rlQd ahcsll Hr,lre 15 devG ot,JtJ ahar th8 }Murud -~ grvan such no11m tfowe-1t-t1.Jn nu Ehlu_nl nhnll lluc.
pdtJ1ll<ma1 period elllOnd boyQJ1<) BO (1;1yn 1\CU<l nHat tha explrnUnn dalo hi \hi" ~Qn\Jlar.sfan ptitlOd (JrO\',dOd In·

tlt:a Pnht:y. WtlllM notlco gi'1Ur> m lhCJ rnoutod or mt:itlod by t-ift to Chu la$l known addrt-~s or ltUJ ra,r.umd er,
futt'l>et\ad by so1d .Employo, shbll oon'illlutr, nouoe.

.

.

· Death Benefit Within Ocrwersro,, PQrlod. JI on tnsurod ~Ins w1thrn the ~1 de-y perlQd durl1\g wh1eh ha WI.lb
anmfatt to apply for an Indrvldlltd pn,Uov ond berot~ sud\ P,n lrtd.lv1~ual poJicv hns bQ~~n.1a bUoonvo, wn w,11
pay to thtt Be"~floiary. the amount ol. life Ioaurance tot which tM:h mdlvidval J)QhCY ooukl have Pl:'ffri 1\l~tJtid
P.P.ymon\ wtll bs mn~a uponJuc.ulpl of tJue proof ot ds9-th, whothor a, J\Ol fff)J)licauon ro, the 1ndlVlduna pohny
u, payme,1\ 01 \tr, nrat prein,um hM beon modb.
.
II wu hnvo t6G01vod tho 1Murel1'tt oppJlt11U,m f(lt IJl.ll'lh fn.chvidual ptJht.'y Uus d•lG1!)nnhPJ\ m \hat ,1pphclJt1t1r\ nl
Q RPnor1c,~,y dUlarenl {ram 1110 bCJMflcfsry urtrlar lht~ Po!r~y ~hell nn\v111hsleudu:1Q any u1h"1 Jtt W1EI1111\ Ol lh1"
Policy tdlua n changii 1'1 lhol hunnf!uJn,y duolgnaled in that appbct11Jon

6 P T I O ·N A L M O D I: S O F S IS T T l 6 M S N T
1he fpJklwmg mo.y efaet, by vmtlon, nolfc:e to our Homo omea. to hava any 131llauJ\l payaUJll ,,Mnr iUr.h
ClltllftcalG patd Q!;GOtd1ng lo thU OJJhOllBl mode& ol !ieltlemenl as rnav he ollrtted hv U!l
(~l 1111> Ownat, wlth Iha ughl uf 1uy1,,n.at1on, ~JI

f.t?> tho Banorro1~r~ after tna lnsu1Ad·a doe1h, 1n c;asrt Iha Ownc1r ha~ nof rnoda on ,,lot.lion

Wi~
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APPLICATION TO:

.e

.

t·

PROVIDENT UFE ANO ACCIDENT INSURANCE: COMPANY
1 Fountain Square, Chattanooga TN 37402

'
Employers Name and Address
. AMJACS INTERWEST INC
4645 SOUTH 400 WEST
MURRAY. UT 84107
1. A Proposed IO&Jrod (Employee)
Social 8ealnly No. Pllooa No.
I

..

',1 qo.O/ -/Jt-lJ

.I

..

I

(19267)

UM Date of Birth

Birth Pface

Heigh! Weigh!

I n):

«:

B Ptoposeo Jf\SU/ed (SJ):)USe)
Social Sealrt!y No. · PhOoo No.
MOate ot8irth : BirthP!ac~ Height We~
~'I i:; '->t,?IAOI pm
KEITH T WIRTZ
. City
2. i,eskle~ Address
Stale
Zip Code
5463 PLANADA WAY. l<El\RNS UT 84118
3. Date ol Emi;lo)'nlent
T Gross locooie: Empoyee $
!Mo.
S{:oo~$
nltJ.
4. Check lho mo insvrance plan }'O\loosiee
Cheek too life insurance plan ytxJ desile
E1t1~\'llB ClAl
□· A D 8 □ C 00 C) E OF · Sor.11se 1101
DA 08 DC OD DE EJF
6. ·Beneflciary DesgMtion
Benelidary 00!:ignation DAWNEEN G NIRTZ
Ralali6ilship
Emdoyee /1Al
Relations!)p i:,nP-P
Scouse (18)
6. Cl}Jdten's Rider· Pick Ooe O Ore Ufjt □- T~-oUrils
A Name
Date ol Billh l B Name(For adduorial children list on reverse skle)
Dato ol Bi!th

I

I

7. WiU any fnstrar.ce, ltd!XlirxJ amuities, In anrcompany oo di~ntinl.'ed or ~llQ iflr~ fnstKaooi ap{>:ied loris lsslX?d?
□ Yes O No II yes,llXfialll.
8. Has any pirson f\Sled alxwe ever been oHcred vduntary Group !,He iOSU'a~ ttco~h an employer, or had any
rated, piSlpmedorcledined? □ Yes -□ No Uye$,expaln..,.___

Raasoo

COO!DanY

1

lmwanca app:calion

,_

Dale

9. Has any person Its led ali9veever had orb~h tmted for ony of the fo!IO'Wlng? •
If yes to any of.the qu~stlons1please explain below.

Ye$..Jlo y_r,,,. Nr VDa

Nn

0
0-

0
□

□· C D

0

D

p

..

a.-n-a:J-·•

:J 0

n

t:J.
CJ
·□

[j

0

D Q :J C: n
0 D
,□ 0
D o □
c:i

0

0
0
0

Pleaso o~pain any Yes answers.
Age. as--O-f-..,-i-0-/-9-1/8 9 f 3-9~
Life insurance amount - 75000
Total Monthiy Premium - 14. 75
Employee Number

..

EmllJow !iP-Qusef Children

/t. Hea~. o'rtdatory'diso;der ot ~Lmatic lever .................. . .......... , ............ . .. .. .... ........
B, Car'A:8t, loti<emia, maJIQOa/lCY, diabetes ot eprep:.)' . ......... ........... .......... ... _.•... , .•. ..... .••
c. Resp1a1ory, aslhma. broochilisorl\J'J9dist.iasa ... . ........ ............. ,....... . ,........ , ........... ...
D, Co~rilaldisorder, delot111lty, paralys/S\)/ musdedisotool .......... " ' •.•.•. '' ..•. ' . ' .. ............., ...
E.- Kid My, liver, nervous or mental disorder...... , .... . ... , ..... ., ......... .. .. ......... , ...............
F. Meefical o~gl'IOsts on,eatment for AIDS (A(Xjtired lmmuoe Deriaeocy Syrd1ome) t( ARC •.. •••• •••..••• •.••
. (A\:ls Relaled Complex) or been tokl Wamedical P/Olesslooal thal you had eithe< ol these coooil.ions • , •• , •. , •
· G. Use of alcoool or hatil lom,li>g dn.igs ", , • , . . ............ ., .•• ,. ............. . ... _.... ......... ......
H,. Jfl\(lleciate l?mi!y deaU\S (mother, ralhe<, siStar, txolhC!) poor to age 62 ofcancer.or caroovascu!ar impalm1ents ••

.I

,
~

. --

:o

0

n n

L)

D

0

11 0

o· LJ 0 'O

~- -~

10. Has any ~rson !isled aoova~ been llllcler observation or rccoived medical treatment or ~d meoo11 or wgcalac¼:e or ooeo hosptafizEQ ·
tn lh:l last 5years? D Yes I No II yas, p'oase ex,:iain rn REMARKS sccoon on m•erse slde.
•
11. Lisi ~sooal ['.i)}'S!cian. Ind~: Name, a&!ress, date last seen ,wson.
~oposed Insured 1A
Ptoposed lnswed , B
Chldren
. -·
12. Kasarr; ~1sonns1ed aoovo used anyto~cco PCoducts in !he lasl 12months? □ Yes D No II Yes, fj~e name,
13. Has any person liSted aoove engaged in mtlin tt'l:l past two (2) years, 0< do ~yrnterxl 10 enga~ in the lotklwir\;;lhazaroous spins:
scuba aving; ~ dMng: hang ~idir,;i:ul1taf19hls: bipanng: and/or autoraci~?
:J Yes • No If yes, e);J)lain.

aro

14. Ha~ any pecson fisted aoove had hisme< dtivc(s-liceose reslricled or revoked, ex ooen cited 10< amoVirg vio1a~onYrithin the last 36 morilhs?
0 Yes D No II ves. expfain.
.
·
IS. Tolal amount orno l11SLl'ance In rotce on each Prop:,sed Insured lrom any coo,pany, Gil'e oe\ails in REMARKS section ¢11 reverse side.

:rf) ~).{; '.,::i.·t;_?~.:.:\. )',: \ ;.1t-fT,j~\~-\,:\'._.Pfease_;1ij,rfi(jv~rj~iSl9tfA.JiPlicaµon?: :,>"_~3~_::-_;;:,~-: -..~ ,. ,, ·:_-.·

0 _:;_

• •• • • ·:~ .- : :
0

·/J~-/f·

L-21427·8 (5·89)

"----------------------------------~~-~

'!Ji~
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I

•

•

Homa O!fletl Arnendmen1s

•

REMMKS: (Use!ll's section to answer oocom~eleo qoostioos on lhe reve<se soo of this ,AppieatiOn.J

•

,I

Atld!Uonal Chllwir\Cor~lldrail's Rfoor (Qoo~on No. 6}!
C, Nama

•

....

Daleof8lrth

, 09.wol Birth . F, Name
'
Dale ofBirth E. Name

D. Name

· :,Pale of Birth ; -~
j1 .

--!...----'-------------..L...---,l,~

t--:-:EA:-CH_P_R_O_PO_S_EO~INS-UR.E-D-AG_A_EE_S_AS-~-0-LL-CWS:-,

i, I am ~ctivefy ~lformlng Iha nvrmal duties of my oocupation' on a!UR-time Msis.
2. To tho best of my koo~edge ar'Xf ooUal1all of lh3 s1.a1emen1s and answers aro Ill.le, comp'eta and oomitJyreairoed.

•

3. Tho rnsuran::e wiQ beoom8 efloowe In aCXXlcd~ with \he terms ar,;l ixovislonsol the Groop Policy•
•4. lno Aganl Is ool autrofued lo: (a} aD:epl risks; or (ll) riiakeor chaJYJe contrads.
5. lt\he lnswallC8 Companycllal>;Jes thlsappfication in Uie S!)9ta named 'Hom&Ol!ire Amendments·, orby separate ell<!o~menl, aci::eptance of
lhe cerufical& 'niU be my agreement to such cllange; except that In \hose states where ii is required by statue or Jnsurailce department
regulation (Including the s1a1as ol Marylc1Jld aod Illinois) any cnange In the amount, cJass ol Jlsl\s, plan ot insurance 01 benefil$ Ytill bo sllbjecl 10
'Mitten co~nt by U1e Proposedlrisurf)d,
·

6. l mm r~ived the MIB, !nc. PreNoliro,
I he:elrf autll:lrirnd any of tt.e fol1C1Mng woo nas any records or l@\11.eoge ol me or ol my heallh, lo give svch lo Im lnsuran:e Coolpany or ils
reinsurer(s): {a) any lfcensed Ji]ys!cian; (b) medical P.ractiUone1; (c) hospital, Q!inlc, orolher medical or mecllcally rolaled facility; (d) lnsuranco
company; (e} !he MIS, lro.; or (QOtll3rorgarizatiol\ insli!utionOfJ)6rson.
·

•

•

• To speiw the submission ol such dala, t aulhorue au said sources, exQlpt MIB, Inc. to give such records or knOW:edge 10 any agency e!llployed by
Uia lnwrance C¢mpany lo ccllectand traosmit su:l1 data. Ai:hologa(illc CO(Y/ oftfis aut.h0ma6on Shall oo as valid as the origoal•

~

•

.®

- · - - - - - , 1s4.
'<'- - - --

- - ' -"---"~

DQ yoi.rh;\ve klxll'lleoga or reasoo lo belieV? Iba! pioposed ilrurance is Intended lo reµaoo any exis~~ Insurance or anrui~es?

:J Yes C

·1hereby certify thal IknoW rotting afleeting the lnstrab-Jil)' of the proposed lnsu,ed\'ltbch ls not fully sel forth In lhese pai:eis. Ihave 001 maoo
or agreed to .make a.rrt rebate of prsmfum /Qr lNs Insurance.

Sigr.edaf _
.. -

•

Ss.,p-\-....

Sigoodontlis
',)q'f~ ______.___fuyof
Prol))seci' lnsvtcd
Proposed lnwred
S:-.gnal\Jta(1A) -"8~L...A.:~_...""u=.w.;;).u.A-'AJ'-4d,,--~ Si!)/\alllre (18}

- - - - - - - ~ - -CiJy.arxJ s1a10

--

Signature of llronsad Agenl

Dale _ _ ____ ... ... · · - - - -- - - -
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•
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•

tuaiiaoa:--=--=---------------~----------..w_1~
..
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1446144762.HST

Pages

AWD History for Work object key 2013-0B-07-13.S4.51.739221T01
SRE-D - POLRES - QPASS - END - Updateable
999999999 - U9001795 - WIRTZ - KEITH - 28 Social Security Num: 999999999
Policy Number: U9001795
Agent Number:
Insured 1 s Last Name: WIRTZ
Printed on Thursday, October 29, 2015 at 2:52:42PM

Begin Time:
User Id:
Workstation Id:
Business Area:
Type:
Status:
Queue:
User Name:
DTM Description:
Comments: ·

~

Begin Date:
Begin Time:
User Id:
Workstation Id:
Business Area:
Type:
Status:
Queue:
User Name:
DTM Description:
Comments:

10:18:29
ALUDDSX

SRE-D
POI.RES
QUESTION
QUESTION
LUDDIE, SHANAAZ X

2013-08-07
14:04:25
JSUITCS

DTM
DTM

DTM
DTM

End
End

Job Name:
Return Code:
Task Name:
Next Tas le:
Date:
2013-08-12
Time:
10:20:27

Flags:
Job Name:
DTM Return Code:
DTM Task Name:
DTM Next Task:
2013-08-07
End Date:
End Time:
14:04:25
DTM

SUITER, CINDY S

Her correct phone# 801-674-5103(cell)

one on system is her home number,

801-266-4359.

Begin Date:
Begin Time:
User Id:
Workstation Id:
Business Area:
Type:
Status:
Queue:
User Name:
DTM Description:
Comments:

2013-08-07
14:01:45
JSUITCS

Flags:
DTM Job Name:

DTM Return Code:
DTM Task Name:

DTM Next Task:
End Date:
End Time:

2013-08-07
14:01:45

SUITER, CINDY S
Please review the ownership on this pol. According to to Dawneen, ex-spouse,
she should be the owner, not Keith. According to the application, Dawneen
Wirtz signed the appl. as this was thru her employer and she has continued to
pay this thru payroll deduction. The add. on system is her address as well.
Please update accordingly if she is suppose to be the owner, not Keith,

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Begin Dat.e:
Begin Time:
User Id:
Workstation Id:

2013-08-07
13:54:53
JSUITCS

Flags:

4000NO

DTM Job Name:
DTM Return Code:

DTM Task Name:

WirtQ(!JMJ~
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Page 1

AWD History for Work object key 2013-10-17-10.31.45.678221T01
SRE-D - REINSTMNY - QPASS - END - Updateable
999999999 - U9001795 - WIRTZ - KEITH - 28 Social Security Nurn: 999999999
Policy Number: U9001795
Insured's Last Name: WIRTZ
Agent Number:
Printed on Thursday, October 29, 2015 at 2:54:23PM
O=====

Begin Date:
Begin Time:
User Id:
Workstation Id:
Business Area:

2013-10-24
09:56:58
JSUITCS

DTM

Begin Date:
Begin Time:
User Id:
Workstation Id:
Business Area:
Type:

Status:
Queue:
User Name:
DTM Description:
Comments:

Begin Date:
Begin Time:
User Id:
Workstation Id:
Business Area:
Type:

Status:
Queue:
User Name:
DTM Description:
Comments:

Begin Date:
Begin Time:

Task Name:

DTM Next Task:

End Date:
End Time:

Type:

Status:
Queue:
User Name:
DTM Description:
comments:

Flags:
DTM Job Name:
DTM Return Code:

2013-10-24
09:56:58

SUITER, CINDY S
Esc. call back: Spoke with Dawneen, conf. the ck she sent was rec'vd. I again
advised we cannot change the address and if she wants to cont. paying she can
• Ask that she try to contact PO(ex-spouse) to get his correct add. and auth.
to update Dawneen as payor or change her to owner if they choose to do so.
Address on system is a very old add. so mail will most likely be returned.
her phone# isBOl-674-5103 or 801-266-4359.

Flags:

2013-10-23
16:18:59

DTM Job Name:

SCURRY

DTM Return Code:

SRE-D
REINSTMNY
QPASS

9990NO

DTM Task Name:
DTM Next Task:

End Date:
End Time:

2013-10-23
16:19:12

Flags:

9990Yl

END
CURRY, SHELIA

2013-10-23
16:17:17
RPURCELL

DTM Job Name:
DTM

Return Code:

DTM Task Name:

SRE-D
REINSTMNY
PROCESSED

DTM Next Task:
End Date:
End Time:

2013-10-23
16:17:29

Flags:

9990NO

CSQC
PURCELL, RICHARD

2013-10-23
16:17:09

DTM Job Name:
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